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INTRODUCTION 
Probably the only thing growing as fast as the number of self-represented 
litigants in our state and federal courts are the efforts to assist and 
accommodate them.1  These efforts, designed to ensure that all individuals 
have meaningful access to the courts, are laudable.  Some proponents 
argue, however, that while current pro se assistance programs are a step in 
the right direction, they are not enough.  They want even more 
“accommodation” by seeking to change the fundamental rules governing 
litigation and the roles of the main players in the judicial system.2  They 
argue that judges, clerks, and even opposing attorneys have an obligation to 
advise and assist a self-represented litigant through the trial process.3  They 
also assert that procedural and evidentiary rules should apply only to 
represented parties, and not those representing themselves.4  In effect, there 
should be one system of justice for the represented, one for the pro se, and 
probably a third for when the pro se litigant is facing a represented party—
naturally each must be separate, but equal, with the others.  This article 
suggests that these proponents of greater pro se assistance and 
accommodation are wrong.  Just as with schools and drinking fountains, 
“separate but equal” justice systems will be neither equal nor just. 
In support of this argument, this article begins by examining the 
prevalence of pro se litigation and the current means of assisting the self-
represented.  It then analyzes the calls for greater assistance and 
accommodation of pro se litigants, and more importantly, explores the false 
                                                          
 1. See infra notes 66-105 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of pro se 
litigation); see also Symposium, Access to Justice:  Does it Exist in Civil Cases?, 17 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 455, 479 (2004) (commenting that pro se litigation is increasing, particularly 
in family law, consumer law, and landlord/tenant law). 
 2. See generally Tiffany Buxton, Foreign Solutions to the U.S. Pro Se Phenomenon, 
34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 103, 138-47 (arguing that procedural and institutional reform in 
United States courts would benefit pro se litigants). 
 3. See Jona Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant’s Struggle for Access to Justice:  
Meeting the Challenge of Bench and Bar Resistance, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 36, 46-49 (2000) 
(arguing that court staff should be trained to provide basic legal information to pro se 
litigants, that pretrial conferences should be conducted to prepare pro se litigants for trial, 
that judges should be authorized to assist pro se litigants and facilitate introduction of their 
evidence, and that judges should be allowed to ask questions, call witnesses, and conduct 
limited investigations). 
 4. See id. (maintaining that new legislation and court rules should be adopted to relax 
rules of evidence and procedure in matters involving pro se litigants). 
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assumptions that underlie the notions of pro se litigation.  Finally, the 
article explores how the calls for greater assistance and accommodation 
will do more to harm the administration of justice for all people—including 
the pro se.  While this view is far from politically correct, the fundamental 
notions of fairness and justice for all demand a preservation of the 
traditional rules and roles. 
I. THE PRO SE PHENOMENON5 
All across the United States, from administrative hearings to oral 
arguments before the United States Supreme Court, people are representing 
themselves—and even sometimes prevailing.6  The rates at which 
individuals represent themselves in court, and the fact that those rates have 
been rising, are well documented.  For instance, in some state courts—
those that handle traffic, landlord/tenant, and child support or other 
domestic relations issues, the number of cases in which at least one side is 
pro se far outnumber those in which counsel represent both parties.7  In 
many of these courts, eighty to ninety percent of cases involve at least one 
pro se litigant.8  While in many cases both sides will be unrepresented, in 
perhaps one-third or more of all litigation a pro se litigant is against a 
represented party.9  This phenomenon is not limited to state courts.  One 
                                                          
 5. See generally Drew A. Swank, The Pro Se Phenomenon, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 373, 
376-78 (2005) (examining the recent rise in pro se litigation, its reasons, and its 
implications). 
 6. Cf. Deborah J. Cantrell, Justice for Interests of the Poor:  The Problem of 
Navigating the System Without Counsel, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1573, 1582 (2002) (noting the 
recent increase in pro se litigation, especially in those areas where the problems of the poor 
are more prevalent).  But see Simran Bindra & Pedram Ben-Cohen, Public Civil Defenders:  
A Right to Counsel For Indigent Civil Defendants, 10 GEO. J. POVERTY LAW & POL’Y 1 
(2003) (stating that pro se litigants rarely prevail).  See generally Buxton, supra note 2, at 
107-08 (recounting pro se litigation’s historical origins in British common law). 
 7. See Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including the Unrepresented Poor:  
Revisiting the Roles of Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 1987 
(1999) (referring to such courts as “poor people’s courts”) [hereinafter Engler, And Justice 
for All]. 
 8. See id. at 2047 (explaining that studies have found such statistics for family law 
cases); Bonnie Rose Hough, Description of California Court’s Programs for Self-
Represented Litigants (2003) (collecting data on the number of pro se litigants in 
California’s family law courts to show that they have increased dramatically in the last 
twenty-five years), available at 
www.unbundledlaw.org/Program%20Profiles/California%20SRL 
%20Projects.pdf; Margaret Martin Barry, Accessing Justice:  Are Pro Se Clinics a 
Reasonable Response to the Lack of Pro Bono Legal Services and Should Law School 
Clinics Conduct Them?, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1879, 1884 (1999) (stating that a 1990 study 
found that approximately ninety percent of divorce cases in Maricopa County, Arizona, 
involved at least one pro se litigant); Paul D. Healey, In Search of the Delicate Balance:  
Legal and Ethical Questions in Assisting the Pro Se Patron, 90 LAW LIBR. J. 129, 132 (1998) 
(reporting that eighty-eight percent of litigants in Washington, D.C., family court represent 
themselves); see also id. (explaining that over 30,000 people represent themselves each year 
in Minneapolis small claims court). 
 9. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2048. 
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study of federal litigation found that pro se cases constituted thirty-seven 
percent of all cases filed.10  Overall, pro se filings account for 
approximately a quarter of all civil cases.11  Once confined “to political 
dissidents or lawyer-haters, self-representation is no longer rare.”12 
The increase in the rate of self-representation is well documented.13  For 
instance, in 1971, only one percent of litigants in California divorce cases 
were pro se.14  By 1985, the rate had risen to forty-seven percent; more 
recently, the rate approached seventy-five percent.15  In other California 
courts, there has been a thirty percent increase in self-representation in five 
years.16  While the largest increase has been in family courts,17 the rise is 
                                                          
 10. Buxton, supra note 2, at 112. 
 11. Deborah Rhode, Access to Justice:  Connecting Principles to Practice, 17 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 369, 400 (2004) [hereinafter Rhode, Connecting]. 
 12. Marie Higgins Williams, The Pro Se Criminal Defendant, Standby Counsel, and the 
Judge:  A Proposal for Better-Defined Roles, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 789, 815 (2000) (citations 
omitted). 
 13. See, e.g., Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts, Magistrate Judges, and 
the Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 475, 479 (2002) (explaining 
that filings in federal courts have increased dramatically and that a significant percentage of 
those filings involve pro se litigants); Ronald W. Staudt & Paula L. Hannaford, Access to 
Justice for the Self-Represented Litigant:  An Interdisciplinary Investigation by Designers 
and Lawyers, 52 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1017, 1018 (2002) (commenting that filings by pro se 
litigants have increased in the past decade); John M. Stanoch, Working With Pro Se 
Litigants:  The Minnesota Experience, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 297, 297 (1998) (stating 
that pro se litigation has increased recently in federal and state courts); Jona Goldschmidt, In 
Defense of Ghostwriting, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1145, 1145 (2002) (referring to the 
“increased presence of pro se litigants in the court”); Michael J. Mueller, Abusive Pro Se 
Plaintiffs in the Federal Courts:  Proposals for Judicial Control, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
93, 101 (1984) (pointing out that pro se litigation has grown faster than case filings and 
caseloads and noting that much of the increase has come from prisoners); Steven K. 
Berenson, A Family Law Residency Program?:  A Modest Proposal in Response to the 
Burdens Created by Self-Represented Litigants in Family Court, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 105, 107 
(2001) (stressing the “rising incidence” of pro se litigants in family court); Candice K. Lee, 
Access Denied:  Limitations on Pro Se Litigants’ Access to the Courts in the Eighth Circuit, 
36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1261, 1280 (2003) (referring to the increase as a “floodtide”); John 
M. Greacen, Self Represented Litigants and Court and Legal Services Responses to Their 
Needs:  What We Know 1 (July 20, 2002) (referring to the increase as an “explosion”)(on 
file with the American University Law Review).  But see id. at 4 (citing data that suggests 
that the numbers of pro se litigants are not increasing, but rather remaining constant in those 
cases in which pro se litigants are common—domestic relations, domestic violence, child 
support, traffic, and landlord/tenant). 
 14. Hough, supra note 8; see also Frances L. Harrison et al., Courts Responding to 
Communities:  California’s Family Law Facilitator Program:  A New Paradigm for the 
Courts, 2 J. CENTER CHILDREN & CTS. 61, 61 (2000) (indicating that, in 1980, only twenty-
four percent of litigants proceeded pro se in California family courts); Engler, And Justice 
for All, supra note 7, at 2052 (mentioning that a 1985 study found that few litigants 
proceeded pro se in bankruptcy court). 
 15. Hough, supra note 8; Harrison, supra note 14, at 61 (contending that self-
representation in divorce cases in California is approaching seventy-five percent); see also 
Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2053 (stating that pro se litigants in bankruptcy 
court have increased dramatically since the 1980s). 
 16. Healey, supra note 8, at 132 (noting that pro se litigants in Santa Monica, California 
family court increased from thirty to sixty percent in the 1990s). 
 17. Berenson, supra note 13, at 105, 110; see Harrison, supra note 14, at 61 (noting that 
the increase has taken place “especially in family law”). 
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not limited to state trial courts; pro se appellants in federal appeals courts 
have increased by forty-nine percent within two years.18  The rise of pro se 
litigation, and its existence in the first place, leads to the most important 
question—why do people represent themselves in court? 
A. The Cost of Counsel—The Usual Explanation for the Growth of Pro Se 
Litigation 
Popular opinion holds that the reason for the increase in pro se litigation 
is the cost of attorneys and litigation.19  It is also believed that all pro se 
civil litigants would have an attorney if only they could afford one.20  
Litigation is expensive—besides attorney fees and court costs, it can result 
in lost wages from missed work, increased child care costs, et cetera.  In 
issues such as divorce, it can even involve relocating, changing jobs, or 
changing lifestyles.21  One author states that “an uncontested divorce that 
does not go to court will cost around $16,500, whereas a contested divorce 
that proceeds to trial could cost more than $150,000.  However, the average 
price for obtaining a divorce is around $20,000.”22  For the poor, many 
issues that require judicial intervention will never be litigated due to these 
costs.23  When they do litigate, they are involuntarily forced to represent 
themselves.24  As one author concluded: 
                                                          
 18. Buxton, supra note 2, at 112; see also Edward M. Holt, How to Treat “Fools”:  
Exploring the Duties Owed to Pro Se Litigants in Civil Cases, 25 J. LEGAL PROF. 167, 167 
(2001) (commenting that pro se cases represent a significant portion of the federal docket). 
 19. See, e.g., Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2027 (characterizing a 
litigant’s appearance without counsel in “poor people’s courts” as “coerced,” and inferring 
that most litigants appear without counsel because they cannot afford it); Julie M. Bradlow, 
Procedural Due Process Rights of Pro Se Civil Litigants, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 659, 669-70 
(1988) (stating that most pro se civil litigants appear without counsel because they cannot 
afford it); Healey, supra note 8, at 133 (explaining that self-representation is primarily 
dictated by economics); see also Joseph M. McLaughlin, An Extension of the Right of 
Access:  The Pro Se Litigant’s Right to Notification of the Requirements of the Summary 
Judgment Rule, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 1109, 1132-33 (1987) (noting that litigants who can 
afford counsel rarely proceed without it); Richard Zorza, The Disconnect between the 
Requirements of Judicial Neutrality and Those of the Appearance of Neutrality when Parties 
Appear Pro Se:  Causes, Solutions, Recommendations, and Implications, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 423, 425 (2004). 
 20. See Lee, supra note 13, at 1265 (suggesting that pro se litigants who cannot afford 
an attorney actually want one). 
 21. Raul V. Esquivel, III, The Ability of the Indigent to Access the Legal Process in 
Family Law Matters, 1 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 79, 84-85 (2000). 
 22. Amy C. Henderson, Meaningful Access to the Courts?: Assessing Self-Represented 
Litigants’ Ability to Obtain a Fair, Inexpensive Divorce in Missouri’s Court System, 72 
UMKC L. REV. 571, 574 (2003), at 573. 
 23. Esquivel, supra note 21, at 85; see also Harrison, supra note 14, at 61 (reasoning 
that lawyers’ imposition of the full-service model on clients disenfranchises those clients 
who cannot afford it). 
 24. See Esquivel, supra note 21, at 92 (stating that, where court-appointed counsel is 
unavailable, the poor must represent themselves either “out of economic necessity as a 
plaintiff or by compulsion as a defendant.”); Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 
2027 (characterizing a poor pro se litigant’s appearance in court without counsel as 
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Ultimately, the predominant reason for self-representation may be simple 
economics.  Only those whose liberty is threatened are guaranteed a 
lawyer.  For others, legal representation involves paying fees at rates 
often over one hundred dollars an hour, perhaps with thousands of 
dollars in advance as a retainer, for representation in a case that can drag 
on for months or even years.  Yet we live in a litigious society, and in the 
course of their lifetime many people will find themselves involved in a 
legal action that affects their fundamental interests, such as a divorce or 
other litigation.  For many such people, obtaining counsel is simply not 
an option.25 
“The inability of a large portion of American society to afford attorney 
assistance has been deemed one of the glaring failures of our system, 
straining the principle of equal justice under the law.”26  The perceived 
result is that pro se litigants  reluctantly participate in the legal system.27 
Unfortunately, the need for legal counsel has increased at the same time 
that more parties are representing themselves in court.28  In the last sixty 
years, legal services “have become more of a necessity and less of a luxury 
when compared to the past.”29  Historically, when individuals cannot hire 
their own counsel, they have turned to low or no-cost legal assistance.  
Legal assistance can come from three sources:  the government or private 
sector in the form of legal services programs, the courts in the form of 
court-appointed counsel, or the bar.  All of these programs, designed to 
offer legal representation at no- or very low-cost to the litigant, have fallen 
short of meeting the demand.30  Both governmentally and privately funded 
legal service programs lack resources to help many civil litigants even 
though they would otherwise be eligible for assistance.31  Only a small 
                                                          
“coerced”); see also Bradlow, supra note 19, at 662 (reasoning that indigent civil litigants 
must represent themselves because they are not entitled to court-appointed representation). 
 25. Healey, supra note 8, at 133. 
 26. McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 1132-33. 
 27. Holt, supra note 18, at 173. 
 28. Cf. Buxton, supra note 2, at 111 (commenting that legal services have become more 
of a necessity as people use the legal system more often for resolution of conflicts); 
Esquivel, supra note 21, at 80-81 (noting that increases in family litigation are out of 
proportion to increases in the population). 
 29. Buxton, supra note 2, at 111. 
 30. See Staudt & Hannaford, supra note 13, at 1019 (indicating that local pro bono and 
legal aid programs could not meet the demand for their services); see also Rhode, 
Connecting, supra note 11, at 378 (noting that certain societal and political constraints have 
limited the success of legal aid programs). 
 31. Eric J.R. Nichols, Preserving Pro Se Representation in an Age of Rule 11 
Sanctions, 67 TEX. L. REV. 351, 384 (1988); see Fern Fisher-Brandveen & Rochelle 
Klempner, Unbundled Legal Services:  Untying the Bundle in New York State, 29 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1107, 1107 (2002) (noting that legal services in New York turn away thousands of 
potential clients each year due to budgetary constraints); Helen B. Kim, Legal Education for 
the Pro Se Litigant:  A Step Towards a Meaningful Right To Be Heard, 96 YALE L.J. 1641, 
1642 (1987) (commenting that legal services often turn away eligible clients because they 
cannot meet the demand for their services); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Equal Justice 
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fraction get assistance, and the assistance they receive is minimal—usually 
only brief advice and not the full-service legal representation that they 
need.32 
Prior to the 1960s, there was very little government assistance for 
representation in civil litigation.33  Recently it has gotten worse.  Over the 
last two decades federal funding of legal service programs has been cut by 
a third while greater restrictions have been placed on the types of cases and 
clients government-funded programs can help.34  Less than one percent of 
the nation’s legal expenditures go to fund legal aid for the poor.35  The lack 
of funding has resulted in four-fifths of the legal needs of the poor and two 
to three-fifths of the legal needs of the middle class being unmet.36  The net 
result is that there is only one lawyer available to serve approximately 
9,000 low-income persons,37 and that, in the mid-1990s, approximately 9.1 
million Americans’ legal needs were unmet.38  It has been estimated that it 
would take three to four billion dollars a year to meet merely the minimal 
civil legal needs of low-income Americans; ten times the $300 million now 
being spent.39 
Other means of providing legal services to the poor have likewise failed.  
Except in very limited circumstances, courts routinely decline to provide 
                                                          
Under Law:  Connecting Principle to Practice, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 47, 54 (2003) 
[hereinafter Rhode, Equal Justice] (explaining that legal services is capable of handling less 
than one-fifth of the needs of its eligible clients). 
 32. Rhode, Equal Justice, supra note 31, at 54; see Kim, supra note 31. 
 33. Buxton, supra note 2, at 106; cf. Barry, supra note 8, at 1879 n.2 (noting that the 
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 instituted the first federally supported legal services 
program for the poor; that prior to 1964, there were about 150 legal aid societies in the 
United States employing 600 lawyers with a combined budget of $4 million; and that within 
a few years of the Act’s passage, that number grew to over 2500 lawyers with a budget in 
excess of $60 million). 
 34. See Cantrell, supra note 6, at 1575 (explaining that federal funding for the Legal 
Services Corporation, the primary source of funding for civil legal services, was cut by 
thirty percent from $400 million to $278 million in 1996); see also Kim, supra note 31, at 
1648 (commenting that reductions in federal assistance to legal aid programs have further 
limited their availability); cf. Rhode, Equal Justice, supra note 31, at 50 (finding that 
legislative budgets for civil legal aid programs have been “minimal,” as the federal 
government, which provides about two-thirds of the funding for such programs, contributes 
approximately eight dollars per year for those officially classified as poor). 
 35. Rhode, Connecting, supra note 11, at 371; Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1788 (2001) [hereinafter Rhode, Access to Justice]. 
 36. Rhode, Connecting, supra note 11, at 371; Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 35, 
at 1785; see Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 1987 (citing reports that eighty 
percent of the legal needs of the “poor and working poor” are unmet); Rhode, Connecting, 
supra note 11, at 371. 
 37. Rhode, Equal Justice, supra note 31, at 47; Cantrell, supra note 6, at 1573. But see 
Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 35, at 1788 (stating that there is one legal aid lawyer or 
public defender for every 4,300 individuals under the poverty line). 
 38. Barry, supra note 8, at 1885. 
 39. Rhode, Equal Justice, supra note 31, at 50; Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 35, 
at 1788. 
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court-appointed counsel in civil cases.40  While courts can appoint counsel 
for a variety of reasons, often they do not.41  With state budgets in crisis, 
the states and courts have little incentive to use what funds they have to 
provide counsel in civil cases.42  Surveys indicate that the vast majority of 
the public favors legal representation for the poor, but only if it does not 
cost them—the taxpayers—anything.43  As one survey found, the majority 
of respondents prefer legal assistance from volunteer attorneys and not 
government subsidies, and forty percent want only advice provided, not 
representation in litigation.44 
The private bar, however, has also failed in providing assistance to those 
who cannot afford legal representation.45  Less than one percent of our 
nation’s lawyers work for legal aid organizations that are to assist the 
seventh of the population that is poor enough to qualify for aid.46  
Volunteer efforts by attorneys—pro bono work—have likewise failed.  
“State supreme courts have adopted only aspirational standards, coupled in 
a few jurisdictions with occasional court assignments or mandatory 
                                                          
 40. Rhode, Equal Justice, supra note 31, at 55; see Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 
35, at 1788 (noting that courts appoint counsel in only a “narrow category of [civil] cases”); 
Tina L. Rasnow, Traveling Justice:  Providing Court Based Pro Se Assistance to Limited 
Access Communities, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1281, 1283 (2002) (explaining that courts may 
appoint counsel in civil matters for a minor in probate or guardianship proceedings, when a 
party is incarcerated, or when a party cannot otherwise appear on his own behalf, such as in 
child support and paternity cases). 
 41. Cf. Nichols, supra note 31, at 384 (commenting that, while civil litigants have a 
right to counsel in “limited types of proceedings,” those with “apparently meritless claims 
may not be given counsel as readily as others.”). 
 42. Cf. Jeffrey Cohan, Alleghany County’s Legal Defense Fund Runs Dry, PITTSBURGH 
POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 20, 2002 (reporting that Allegheny County ran out of money to pay 
court-appointed criminal defense attorneys), available at http://www.post-
gazette.com/localnews/20020820defense0820p2.asp; Eric Bartels, Protest Arrests May Clog 
Courts, PORTLAND TRIB., Mar. 28, 2003 (stating that the state budget crisis led to the 
elimination of court days and delayed trials for months), available at 
http://www.portlandtribune.com/archview.cgi?id=17336.  See generally David M. 
Herszenhorn, How Did Such a Rich State Get So Poor?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2002 
(discussing recent budget crises in Connecticut), available at http://www.ccsu.edu/aa 
up/csu/herszenhornarticle.htm; Jeffrey L. Rabin, State Spent Its Way Into Budget Crisis, 
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2002 (describing recent budget crises in California), available at 
www.caltax.org/LATimes-StateSpentWayIntoBudgetCrisis10-29-02.pdf; Robert Sandler, 
State lawmakers are calling this the worst budget in years, Mar. 1, 2002 (discussing recent 
budget crises in Missouri and speculating about possible budget cuts), available at 
http://www.mdn.org/2002/Stories/Budget3.htm. 
 43. See Rhode, Equal Justice, supra note 31, at 53 (stating that the public generally 
favors legal assistance for the poor); Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 35, at 1791 
(claiming that between sixty-five and eighty-five percent of Americans support providing 
legal aid to the poor in civil cases); see also id. (explaining that there is broad support for 
public assistance in cases involving domestic violence, divorce, child custody, and fraud 
against the elderly, and that there is little support for such assistance in challenges to welfare 
legislation or prison conditions). 
 44. Id.; Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 35, at 1796. 
 45. See generally Rhode, Equal Justice, supra note 31, at 59 (discussing the “failures of 
the bar” in assisting those who cannot afford counsel). 
 46. Rhode, Connecting, supra note 11, at 371. 
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reporting systems.  Yet, most lawyers have failed to meet these aspirational 
goals, and the performance of the profession as a whole remains at a 
shameful level.”47  As one commentator noted: 
[R]ecent surveys indicate that most lawyers provide no significant pro 
bono assistance to the poor.  In most states, fewer than a fifth of lawyers 
offer such services.  The average pro bono contribution is under half an 
hour a week and half a dollar a day . . . . Fewer than a fifth of the 
nation’s 100 most financially successful firms meet the ABA’s standard 
of providing fifty hours a year of pro bono service.  Over the past 
decade, when these firms’ revenues grew by over fifty percent, their 
average pro bono hours decreased by a third.  For many other employers, 
salary wars have pushed compensation levels to new heights, which has 
eroded, rather than expanded, support for pro bono programs.48 
The small amount of pro bono work currently being provided has not 
relieved the need for legal services.49  All told, “seventy to eighty percent 
or more of low-income persons are unable to obtain legal assistance when 
they need and want it.”50  One writer summed up the situation by stating:  
“It is a national disgrace that civil legal aid programs now reflect less than 
one percent of the nation’s legal expenditures.  It is a professional disgrace 
that pro bono service occupies less than one percent of lawyers’ working 
hours.”51  The end result is that those who represent themselves in court 
will usually have no access to any professional legal advice.52 
B. The Ability to Proceed Pro Se53 
Regardless if a person wants to represent himself in court, he or she 
normally has the opportunity to do so.  Historically, the ability in the 
United States to represent oneself in court dates to the founding of our 
country.54  Having its roots in the British common law,55 self-representation 
                                                          
 47. Rhode, Equal Justice, supra note 31, at 59; see Cantrell, supra note 6, at 1577 
(asserting that lawyers have failed to provide adequate public assistance despite a significant 
“pro bono infrastructure”). 
 48. Rhode, Connecting, supra note 11, at 59-60. 
 49. See Barry, supra note 8, at 1884-85 (stating that lawyer volunteerism in the District 
of Columbia has not made an impact despite an increase in the District of Columbia Circuit 
Judicial Conference’s recommended per-laywer pro bono contribution to fifty hours per 
year or a financial contribution of four hundred dollars). 
 50. Alex J. Hurder, Nonlawyer Legal Assistance and Access to Justice, 67 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2241, 2241 (1999) (citing COMMISSION ON NONLAWYER PRACTICE, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
NONLAWYER ACTIVITY IN LAW-RELATED SITUATIONS 77 (1995)). 
 51. Rhode, Equal Justice, supra note 31, at 62; Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 35, 
at 1819. 
 52. Esquivel, supra note 21, at 93. 
 53. See generally Swank, supra note 5. 
 54. See Holt, supra note 18, at 168 (noting that the right to represent oneself was first 
recognized in the Judiciary Act of 1789); cf. Goldschmidt, supra note 3, at 36 (explaining 
that, in ancient times, pro se litigants were the only litigants). 
 55. Buxton, supra note 2, at 107; see also Nichols, supra note 31, at 379-80 
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evolved as a combined proposition of “natural law,” an early anti-lawyer 
sentiment,56 and the egalitarian “all men are created equal” concept that 
“financial status should not have a substantial impact on the outcome of 
litigation.”57  The American ideal of justice is that both the wealthy and the 
poor can have access to the courts, and be treated equally before it with the 
resulting decisions being as fair as possible.58  Open access to the courts for 
all citizens has also been viewed as being important for the development of 
law and public policy and the “avoidance of citizens resorting to non-
judicial self-help.”59 
The Judiciary Act of 1789 was an early codification of this belief.  It 
granted “parties the right to ‘plead and conduct their own case personally’ 
in any court of the United States.”60  Many states, either through their 
constitutions or statutorily, also provide individuals with the right to 
proceed pro se.61  It is unclear, however, if there is a right to self-
representation pursuant to the Constitution of the United States.62  The 
Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to have 
assistance of counsel; by implication the Amendment has served as a basis 
to hold that criminal defendants can waive that right and appear pro se.63  
                                                          
(recognizing the “historical tolerance, if not preference,” for pro se litigants in the Anglo-
American judicial system). 
 56. Cf. Goldschmidt, supra note 3 (noting that necessity of counsel and anti-lawyer 
sentiment have a long history of coexistence). 
 57. Buxton, supra note 2, at 109 (discussing the creation in the United States of 
“paupers’ rights”—court-ordered waivers of a poor litigant’s court fees or costs). 
 58. See id. at 111 (explaining that the rationales behind a litigant’s right to proceed pro 
se come down to a “court’s attempt to reach the fairest result for the litigant under the 
circumstances.”). 
 59. Nichols, supra note 31, at 380 (citations omitted). 
 60. Buxton, supra note 2, at 110 (discussing the Act as revised in 1948); see also 
Bradlow, supra note 19, at 661 (stating generally that a civil litigant’s statutory right to 
represent himself began with the Act); Holt, supra note 18, at 168 (recognizing that the Act 
was the first to recognize a civil litigant’s right to represent himself).  This privilege 
continues today as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2005). See Andrew Robert Schein, 
Attorney Fees for Pro Se Plaintiffs Under the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts, 63 
B.U. L. REV. 443, 467 n.146 (1983) (citing the 1976 version of the statute, which is identical 
to the current version). 
 61. Lee, supra note 13, at 1265-66; Bradlow, supra note 19, at 661. 
 62. See McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 1109 (commenting that it is unclear whether the 
constitutional right of criminal defendants to proceed pro se extends to civil litigants); Lee, 
supra note 13, at 1265 (explaining that courts are split on whether civil litigants have a 
constitutional right to self-representation); cf. John F. Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right to 
Shoot Oneself in the Foot:  An Assessment of the Guarantee of Self-Representation Twenty 
Years After Faretta, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 483, 596, 598 (1996) (arguing that the Sixth 
Amendment does not provide a right to self-representation).  But cf. Bloom & Hershkoff, 
supra note 13, at 484-85 (implying that civil litigants have a constitutional right to appear in 
court without the assistance of counsel). 
 63. Bradlow, supra note 19, at 660; see Buxton, supra note 2, at 105 (explaining that 
the Sixth Amendment led to the increased protection of criminal defendants’ pro se rights); 
see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 816 (1975) (providing examples of where the 
Supreme Court and United States Courts of Appeals have indicated that a criminal 
defendant has a right to represent himself).  But see Decker, supra note 62, at 596 (arguing 
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Additionally, the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments have served as 
support for the right of individuals to have access to the courts without 
being represented.64  Whatever right there is to proceed pro se in criminal 
cases, however, has not been extended by the Supreme Court to civil 
cases.65 
C. The Effect of Pro Se Litigation 
What have also been well documented are the negative anecdotal 
impressions regarding the increase in pro se litigation.66  Pro se litigants are 
thought of as being underprivileged, uneducated,67 and lacking basic 
litigation skills.68  A pro se litigant is “untutored in the law, ignorant of his 
legal rights and unable to communicate effectively in writing.”69  The 
increase in pro se litigation has disrupted the efficiency of the courts, 
causing courtroom delays and overburdening judges, attorneys, and court 
staff.70  Many pro se litigants require additional time at the clerk’s office 
and in the courtroom because they do not understand the procedures or the 
limitations of the court.71  Pro se litigants are “most often attacked for the 
judicial inefficiencies many judges, attorneys, and observers believe they 
create.  They are more likely to neglect time limits, miss court deadlines, 
and have problems understanding and applying the procedural and 
                                                          
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not guarantee a right to self-representation). 
 64. See Nichols, supra note 31, at 379-80 (reasoning that pro se litigation implicates the 
right of access to the courts, which is guaranteed by the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments); see also McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 1116 (contending that the right of 
access to the courts guarantees pro se litigants an adequate hearing on all grievances). 
 65. See Nichols, supra note 31, at 379 (explaining that, in Faretta, the Supreme Court 
held that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to self-representation, and that the 
Court has not extended that holding to civil litigants); cf. McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 
1109 (commenting that it is unclear whether civil litigants have a right to self-
representation). 
 66. See Buxton, supra note 2, at 114-15 (noting that judges, attorneys, and court 
observers often complain about the inefficiencies that result from pro se litigants); Jonathan 
D. Rosenbloom, Exploring Methods to Improve Management and Fairness in Pro Se Cases:  
A Study of the Pro Se Docket in the Southern District of New York, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
305, 312-14 (stating that the negative perception of pro se litigants has not been objectively 
studied or documented, but is rather based on anecdotal evidence); see also Connie J. A. 
Beck & Bruce D. Sales, A Critical Reappraisal of Divorce Mediation Research and Policy, 
6 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & L. 989, 993 (2000) (providing an overview of studies that used 
anecdotal evidence from judges and court staff to conclude that pro se litigants adversely 
impact the court system). 
 67. McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 1119. 
 68. Holt, supra note 18, at 167 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)). 
 69. Mueller, supra note 13, at 101-02. 
 70. Henderson, supra note 22, at 576; Berenson, supra note 13, at 112-13; see Engler, 
And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2050-51 (reporting that pro se litigants are perceived as 
“unduly burdening” court clerks); Esquivel, supra note 21, at 93 (noting that there is a belief 
that the cases of pro se litigants are slow to resolve). 
 71. Hough, supra note 8. 
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substantive law pertaining to their claim.”72  The self-represented are often 
described as “pests” and “nuts,” who are an “increasing problem” clogging 
our courts.73  Some pro se litigants may clutter up cases with rambling, 
illogical pleadings, motions, and briefs, intent on pursuing their own 
personal vendettas or advancing personal, social, and political agendas.74  
Some lawyers and judges even express concerns that pro se litigants are 
using their status to gain an unfair advantage over represented parties, who 
are required to “play by the rules.”75  The problems of pro se litigants in 
New York’s Housing Court are so vast that they have led to periodic calls 
for the elimination of that court entirely.76  Often overlooked is the effect 
that being pro se has on the litigants themselves; they often suffer more 
than judges, court administrators, and staff in pursuing their efforts to 
achieve justice.77 
D.  The Response to Pro Se Litigation and the Growth of Pro Se Assistance 
It is precisely because of the growth of pro se litigation, and the 
problems encountered both by pro se litigants and the courts, that a variety 
of pro se assistance programs have been created.  Assistance programs and 
courts designed primarily for the self-represented are not necessarily a new 
phenomenon.  In 1921, California created a Small Claims Court designed 
for self-represented litigants; in 1978 the state created the Small Claims 
Advisor Program to provide free assistance to pro se litigants in these small 
claims courts.78  Other states and courts have also created a variety of 
approaches for assisting pro se litigants,79 paying millions of dollars to 
                                                          
 72. Buxton, supra note 2, at 114. 
 73. Rosenbloom, supra note 66, at 381. 
 74. Nichols, supra note 31, at 351. 
 75. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 1988; see also Healey, supra note 8, at 
133 (contending that litigants may represent themselves to increase their chances for delay 
or a mistrial); cf. Mueller, supra note 13, at 98 (arguing that pleadings rules should be 
relaxed for pro se litigants); Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. 
L. REV. 39, 44 n.2 (1989) (discussing how ethical constraints on attorneys do not fully apply 
to pro se litigants). 
 76. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2065. 
 77. Berenson, supra note 13, at 112, 115 (recognizing the adverse consequences that an 
increase in pro se litigants have on family law courts, but noting that such an increase may 
ultimately result in a “miscarriage of justice” for the pro se litigants, as their obvious 
disadvantage in the courtroom may result in denial of their meritorious claims). 
 78. Hough, supra note 8.  By California statute, each county in California must provide 
some sort of assistance to pro se litigants before its courts.  Id. 
 79. See, e.g., Barry, supra note 8, at 1892-93 (describing Maricopa County (Arizona) 
Superior Court’s Self-Service Center, which aids approximately 400 low-income people per 
day); Frances H. Thompson, Access to Justice in Idaho, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1313, 1319 
(2002) (reporting that Idaho created Court Assistance Offices in each of its seven judicial 
districts to provide assistance to low-income people in family law matters); see also 
Berenson, supra note 13, at 122 (providing an overview of approaches that have been taken 
to address the adverse consequences of pro se litigation). 
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create or enhance pro se assistance efforts.80  Whether government or 
privately funded, these pro se assistance efforts, “despite any variation in 
detail and structure, can be grouped into two basic categories:  those 
designed to provide legal advice and those designed to provide assistance 
short of legal advice.”81 
1. Assistance short of legal advice 
Providing legal information to pro se litigants increases their chances of 
success in legal matters.82  Effective pro se assistance programs provide 
three types of information:  how to bring an issue before the court, how the 
matter is processed before the court, and what to do after court in order to 
either comply with or enforce the court’s order.83  To help bring an issue 
before the court, the pro se litigant needs a basic overview of the court 
system and the forms needed to start the process.84  The overview lets the 
pro se litigant know what a particular court can and cannot do, and 
describes the litigation process.85  Providing simply written, court-approved 
forms, completed samples, and clearly written instructions is perhaps one 
of the most important functions a pro se assistance program can serve.86  
The best, most cost-effective programs not only provide clear, complete 
forms, but also written, video, or interactive directions that are easy to 
understand and in the pro se litigants’ languages.87 
The second type of information—about how a case is processed in 
court—should contain both procedural rules and local court administrative 
requirements.88  Everything from a basic primer on courtroom behavior, 
                                                          
 80. See Access to Justice:  Does it Exist in Civil Cases?, supra note 1, at 479 (stating 
that courts are pouring millions of dollars into self-help classes for pro se litigants). 
 81. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2001.  But see Berenson, supra note 13, 
at 105 (classifying pro se assistance efforts into three categories:  (1) efforts that embrace 
self-representation; (2) those which seek to increase the provision of legal services to pro se 
litigants by non-attorneys; and (3) those which seek to increase the availability of attorneys 
to self-represented litigants). 
 82. Lee, supra note 13, at 1282; Kim, supra note 31, at 1642. 
 83. Richard Zorza, The Self-Help Friendly Court:  Designed from the Ground Up to 
Work for People Without Lawyers 17 (2002), available at 
http://www.zorza.net/Res_ProSe_Self 
HelpCtPub.pdf#search=‘The%20SelfHelp%20Friendly%20Court’. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See generally Barry, supra note 8, at 1892 (discussing a superior court’s decision to 
use a Self Service Center to  assist pro se litigants); John M. Greacen, Legal Information vs. 
Legal Advice:  Developments during the last five years, 84 JUDICATURE 198 (2001), 
available at http://www.ajs.org/prose/pro_greacen.asp; Report of the Working Committees 
to the Second Circuit Task Force on Gender, Racial and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts, 
1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 124, 301-05 (1997) (focusing on the burden that women and 
minorities face as pro se litigants). 
 87. Barry, supra note 8, at 1889-1919 (citing examples where a variety of formats 
proved useful in educating pro se litigants). 
 88. Id. 
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rules of evidence, and burdens of proof should be included.89  The 
information should also specify how to request continuances from the court 
and what the possible consequences are of not following the court’s 
orders.90  This last aspect is the third and final type of information that 
should be included in pro se assistance information.  How to comply with, 
or enforce an order, is often overlooked even though it is arguably the most 
important information a pro se litigant needs.91  Just as prevailing at trial 
matters little if the judgment is not enforced, being held in contempt by the 
court for not understanding the ramifications of failing to follow its orders 
can be as bad, if not worse, as losing at trial.92  Pro se assistance materials 
need to stress what to do after court, including how to appeal an order and 
how to request a rehearing. 
2. How to provide the information 
Just as there can be a variety of types of information to provide pro se 
litigants, there likewise are a variety of forms in which the information can 
be presented.  These forms can be broken down into two basic types—
programs with human interaction and impersonal or automated systems.93  
Programs with human interaction can include offices, information tables, 
and kiosks, court clinics, and “live” telephone systems manned by 
volunteer laypeople, pro se clerks, staff or volunteer attorneys, and law 
students.94  General information about the law, procedure, and practice can 
be provided either individually or to a group of pro se litigants in a clinic 
setting.95  Pro se litigants are typically assisted with finding the information 
needed to complete court forms, but generally the staff or volunteers do not 
prepare forms for the pro se litigant.96  The goal of this approach is to 
provide sufficient information to allow the pro se litigant “to understand 
and access the type of pleadings required, basic rules such as service of 
process, basic information that the court will require to render a decision, 
and a sense of the range of remedies available.”97 
Examples of impersonal or automated systems include books, pamphlets, 
informational sheets, videos, automated telephone systems, and Internet 
                                                          
 89. Rebecca A. Albrecht et al., Judicial Techniques for Cases Involving Self-
Represented Litigants, 42 JUDGE’S J. 16, 45 (2003). 
 90. Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Helping the Pro Se Litigant:  A Changing Landscape, 
2003 CT. REV. 8, 14-15. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 1999-2000 (listing a variety of ways 
that courts have dealt with the increase in unrepresented litigants). 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Barry, supra note 8, at 1883 (explaining that such clinics provide a range of 
critical information to pro se litigants). 
 96. Thompson, supra note 79, at 1314-15. 
 97. Barry, supra note 8, at 1883. 
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websites.98  Videos on the court process, in pro se litigants’ languages, can 
be very successful in walking litigants through legal procedures and 
explaining what they are likely to encounter in court.99  Besides being able 
to be played in courthouse lobbies and waiting areas, videos can be lent to 
libraries, community organizations, and legal service providers.100 
Perhaps the greatest potential for aiding pro se assistance efforts is the 
growth of information access and sharing through the Internet.101  Forms 
and instructions are made available online, as are answers to frequently 
asked questions.102  An eventual goal of such a technological approach is to 
create an Internet-based interactive system to generate forms using the pro 
se litigant’s responses to a series of questions.103  Computers are also being 
made available in courthouses to help pro se litigants; automated kiosks 
such as QuickCourt and ICan produce complete legal documents for use in 
court proceedings.104  These interactive systems can be programmed to 
provide information in a variety of languages, with the goal of greatly 
reducing the number of questions posed to court staff while increasing the 
segments of the population that can be served.105 
3. Pro se programs that give legal advice 
Full-service pro se assistance programs—ones that not only provide legal 
information but also legal advice—are the legal equivalent to the “big-box” 
home improvement stores as they “suppl[y] the tools used to do the task 
yourself.”106  Some proponents of pro se assistance believe that telling 
people the law is not enough; programs also need to give guidance and 
advice on how to use the information provided.107  Pro se assistance 
programs that give legal advice, in addition to all forms of information 
described above, fall into two basic categories:  those programs that are 
                                                          
 98. See generally id. at 1899-1919 (surveying types of assistance that courts provide in 
different parts of the country); Hough, supra note 8. 
 99. Barry, supra note 8, at 1915. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Margaret B. Flaherty, How Courts Help You Help Yourself:  The Internet and the 
Pro Se Divorce Litigant, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 91, 91-93 (2002) (detailing the utility of self-
sufficient websites for pro se divorce litigants). 
 102. Thompson, supra note 79, at 1314-15, 1318; Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 
7, at 2000. 
 103. See Thompson, supra note 79, at 1320 (discussing a project aimed at aiding pro se 
litigants in domestic violence suits). 
 104. See Barry, supra note 8, at 1894 (noting that due to success of the assistance 
program, twenty-five kiosks were opened—though those privately run kiosks were unable to 
be financially self-sustaining, preventing the further expansion of the program). 
 105. See Staudt & Hannaford, supra note 13, at 1020 (noting counties’ efforts to 
minimize strain on courts and pro se litigants through creation of self-help centers). 
 106. Barry, supra note 8, at 1894. 
 107. See Zorza, supra note 83, at 16-17 (concluding that piecemeal reforms will not 
resolve issues for pro se litigants); Kim, supra note 31, at 1643, 1650-51 (suggesting that 
information particularized to the pro se litigant’s case is necessary for effective assistance). 
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court or courthouse based and officially sponsored by the court system, and 
those that are, both physically and organizationally, outside the court 
system. 
Few court-based programs that provide pro se legal advice also provide 
any sort of representation.108  As most of these programs serve a high 
volume of pro se litigants, often the legal advice given is not extensive.109  
Rather, the focus is on what the burdens of proof are for different causes of 
action, providing pro se litigants resources to better understand what he or 
she needs to do in order to meet those burdens,110 or reviewing their 
pleadings and motions to ensure they are properly prepared and logically 
consistent prior to submission to the court.111  A by-product of discovering 
what they would have to prove at trial in order to prevail is that many pro 
se litigants realize that they might be unsuccessful at trial and therefore 
may be more willing to seek lesser remedies or negotiate a settlement with 
the other party.112  This process of evaluating the merits of claims is one of 
the more often overlooked roles of counsel and an area that is extremely 
vital to any pro se assistance program.113  These programs provide advice in 
person, by telephone, or via e-mail.114  Even with programs that provide 
legal advice, many queries are merely generic legal questions.115  By 
performing initial case intake and screening, the court-based pro se 
assistance program can direct individuals to state and community agencies 
that might be able to help them with their underlying issues.116 
The other form of pro se legal assistance that provides legal advice is 
provided by private attorneys, working either for free or reduced rates, and 
legal aid organizations operating outside the courthouse.  While 
courthouse-based pro se assistance programs might refer pro se litigants to 
these programs, they are private entities separate from the official 
organizations that are operating within the courthouses.117  These 
organizations provide the same services as the courthouse-based programs, 
but typically function under significant budgetary restraints.118 
                                                          
 108. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2001-02 (finding that pro se litigants 
benefiting from the aid of assistance programs do not receive much in the way of real legal 
advice). 
 109. Id. 
 110. See Thompson, supra note 79, at 1316-17 (noting that some judges require pro se 
litigants to have their forms checked by a Court Assistance Office prior to submission to 
ensure quality). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 1317. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See id. at 1317-18 (referring to support implemented by the Idaho Legal 
Foundation). 
 115. Id. at 1318. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 1314. 
 118. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text. 
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E. Goals and Benefits of Pro Se Assistance Programs 
Regardless of the type of pro se assistance program, there are certain 
goals that are common to all programs.  These goals include education of 
the litigation process, improving communication with the court, increasing 
litigant satisfaction, increasing access to justice, and increasing the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the courts.119  An additional goal of any pro 
se assistance program would be to help the pro se litigant resolve his or her 
issues without going to court, either through settlement or alternative 
dispute resolution.120  Having cases resolved out of court also helps to 
reduce the ever-growing burden on the court system.121 
Pro se litigation assistance programs benefit the courts and other litigants 
in other ways as well.122  Generally, after receiving information or 
assistance, pro se litigants’ paperwork submitted to the courts is better 
prepared, litigants understand court processes better, are better able to 
present their case, are more self-confident, and less likely to have their 
cases rescheduled than those that do not utilize an assistance program.123  
Pro se litigants who understand what is going on, who file the correct 
paperwork with the court, and who are not constantly asking questions of 
court staff, place a lighter burden on the court and therefore free up 
resources for other litigants.124  When pro se litigants are properly prepared, 
court proceedings have the potential to be completed with fewer 
continuances and more quickly than proceedings where both parties are 
represented.125  Even the taxpayer can benefit through pro se assistance 
programs, as there is evidence that they are much more cost effective than 
other forms of legal assistance.126 
Providing assistance to individuals who represent themselves is a 
response to the chronic lack of legal representation for all persons who 
                                                          
 119. Hough, supra note 8. See generally Kim, supra note 31, at 1641 (claiming the right 
to be heard in court lacks value if those heard as pro se litigants do not have the requisite 
knowledge to properly argue their claims). 
 120. But see Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 1988-89 (arguing that the 
pressure to settle often results in the forfeiture of a litigant’s rights). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Barry, supra note 8, at 1881 (suggesting that for poor litigants, there is intrinsic 
value in understanding their rights and representing themselves rather than depending on pro 
bono representation); Henderson, supra note 22, at 575-76, 587 (referring to litigants who 
have had their confidence boosted through self-representation). 
 123. Thompson, supra note 79, at 1317; Greacen, supra note 13, at 2, 22, 24; see 
Henderson, supra note 22, at 587 (citing a national survey that reported lower numbers of 
document rejection where programs aided pro se litigants). 
 124. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2041; Henderson, supra note 22,  at 
587. 
 125. See Greacen, supra note 13, at 10 (providing a detailed chart that demonstrates the 
potential speed of cases featuring pro se litigants). 
 126. Id. at 3 (citing a report that found self-help programs were up to one-half the cost of 
other legal assistance programs). 
SWANK OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  2:46:15 PM 
1554 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1537 
desire it.127  As access to justice cannot be predicated on having counsel,128 
the concept of pro se assistance remains an attractive, “next best” 
alternative to full-service legal representation.129  Ultimately, the choice is 
not between having either a pro se program or not, but rather it is between 
having either a planned pro se assistance program or an unplanned pro se 
assistance program.130  Even with a pro se assistance program, not all 
difficulties disappear; no matter how carefully forms are designed or how 
much help is given, some litigants will still have problems.131 
F. The Perceived Failure of the Existing Pro Se Assistance Efforts 
Despite the merits and enviable goals of pro se assistance programs, 
there nevertheless have been a variety of concerns and criticisms about 
them.  Some critics feel these programs are not enough.  They argue that 
the “educational” approach of pro se assistance 
[H]as resulted in a system that recognizes the need for access to justice 
through the courts yet simultaneously preempts any opportunity for a 
meaningful review of the pro se claims placed before it.  This is largely 
due to the system’s rigid adherence to the procedural motions and 
process of traditional litigation.  As a result, although the procedural 
mechanism of proceeding pro se technically allows a large portion of our 
population to proceed with their claims, the net effect of this mechanism 
denies those choosing to proceed pro se a truly meaningful review of 
their claims.132 
There is an inherent limitation of any information-based pro se 
                                                          
 127. Id. at 12; see Kim, supra note 31, at 1647 (noting that unlike criminal defendants, 
counsel is not freely available to civil litigants); Rhode, Equal Justice, supra note 31, at 47 
(citing a Legal Services Corporation’s finding that eighty percent of legal services needed 
by the poor go unmet); Fisher-Brandveen & Klempner, supra note 31, at 1107. 
 128. Goldschmidt, supra note 13, at 1208-09 (touting the benefits of “ghostwriting,” 
despite its disfavor in the legal system).  “It is hypocritical to claim to provide fairness to 
everyone through a system that is not prepared to do so for those without lawyers.”  Engler, 
And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2031. 
 129. Peter D. Houk & Donald L. Reisig, Access to Justice:  Facing the Challenge of 
Unrepresented Parties:  Pro Se Assistance Relies on Bench-Bar Cooperation, 78 MI BAR J. 
1126, 1126 (1999) (discussing unrepresented litigants in divorce proceedings); Rasnow, 
supra note 40, at 1284 (analyzing the Family Law Pro Se Clinic for the Ventura Superior 
Court); Barry, supra note 8, at 1882 (questioning whether the emphasis of pro se programs 
on domestic relations issues is due to the volume of domestic relations cases or to the 
undervaluing of the issue). 
 130. Barry, supra note 8, at 1889-1919. 
 131. Id. at 5; see Berenson, supra note 13, at 106 (proposing a legal assistance program 
loosely based on medical education programs); Rasnow, supra note 40, at 1310-11 
(emphasizing the continued need for legal aid programs, pro bono and social services); 
Report of the Working Committees to the Second Circuit Task Force on Gender, Racial and 
Ethnic Fairness in the Courts, supra note 86, at 310 (reminding that at times it is 
appropriate for a court to appoint counsel to a pro se litigant). 
 132. Buxton, supra note 2, at 106. 
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assistance program:  telling people the law is not enough.133  While telling a 
pro se litigant how to act in court, what to bring, and how to fill out a form 
is important, it will neither prepare him for all of the obstacles he will face, 
nor serve as a substitute for representation by qualified, competent 
counsel.134  Programs that provide legal advice are little better; limited 
encounters with lawyers and assistance from non-lawyers may not provide 
pro se litigants with enough assistance and information to enable them to 
make informed choices about their cases or fully pursue their legal 
rights.135  Even the most eager and intelligent pro se litigant cannot be 
expected to learn and understand procedural and substantive law in a short 
amount of time.136  Legal rights are often overlooked as users take as 
gospel, and rely upon, the generalities offered in assistance—even though 
there are disclaimers that the information provided is general in nature and 
not a substitute for legal advice.137  Encounters with pro se assistance 
materials or staff may produce only partially prepared, and often confused, 
pro se litigants138 who gain a false sense of security from such 
encounters.139  This can be especially true if the pro se litigant lacks 
functional literacy to understand the pro se assistance material.140 
Another of the most consistent criticisms of current self-represented 
assistance programs is the resistance to allowing judges, clerks, and court 
staff to provide legal advice.141  No matter how many self-represented 
assistance programs there are or how simple forms may be designed, clerks 
will always be asked questions,142 and “handing out forms coupled with 
referral to a kiosk or clinic is not always the best response.”143  
Furthermore, as self-represented litigants may require assistance before, 
                                                          
 133. Zorza, supra note 83, at 14; Report of the Working Committees to the Second 
Circuit Task Force on Gender, Racial and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts, supra note 86, at 
310; Kim, supra note 31, at 1643, 1650-51. 
 134. See generally Staudt & Hannaford, supra note 13, at 1020-21 (analyzing a research 
project that addressed the issue); Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2002-03 
(stressing that programs do not usually provide assistance for the duration of the 
proceedings); Goldschmidt, supra note 13, at 1207 (defending the practice of ghostwriting 
for pro se litigants). 
 135. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2002-03, 2005; Staudt & Hannaford, 
supra note 13, at 1020; Barry, supra note 8, at 1890. 
 136. See Rosenbloom, supra note 66, at 306 (claiming pro se litigants are nearly 
unanimously under-prepared to argue their claims). 
 137. Barry, supra note 8, at 1889. 
 138. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 1890 (noting that assistance programs 
aid in the unrepresented litigant’s endeavor). 
 139. Id. at 1888. 
 140. Report of the Working Committees to the Second Circuit Task Force on Gender, 
Racial and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts, supra note 86, at 308 (explaining that in several 
judicial districts in New York, forms are only available in English). 
 141. Barry, supra note 8, at 1880. 
 142. Greacen, supra note 86, at 199. 
 143. Barry, supra note 8, at 1916-17. 
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during trial, and after trial, some argue that the clerks and other court staff 
are in a unique position to provide the assistance.144  Traditionally, clerks 
and court personnel have been allowed to provide legal information, but 
not legal advice.  What constitutes legal advice versus legal information is 
nebulous at best; despite numerous attempts to define the difference, there 
is no clear, consistent answer.145  To make the distinction some focus on 
the phrasing of a question,146 but as critics correctly point out, the questions 
clerks receive rarely come formatted and phrased so as to be classified 
correctly.147 
Ultimately, some argue that even with the assistance currently given, pro 
se litigants still may not have meaningful access to the courts.148  Designers 
of pro se assistance programs admit that such programs are often 
inadequate to meet the needs of the litigants or ensure their access to 
justice.149  Critics stress that limited-assistance models, operating under the 
traditional rules, are insufficient in helping pro se litigants, especially in 
cases where the other party is represented.150 
Proponents for greater pro se assistance and accommodation assert that 
pro se litigants are hindered, confused, and frustrated by the complexity of 
the law and the legal process.151  Despite liberal pleading requirements, 
“pro se litigants are almost unanimously ill equipped to encounter the 
complexities of the judicial system.”152  Pro se litigant complaints often fail 
to survive procedural requirements and motions to reach an actual trial for 
a meaningful review of their claim.153  They may be getting their day in 
court merely to lose their case because they are unaware of their rights or 
do not understand the theory behind proving their case.154  Pro se litigants 
                                                          
 144. See Holt, supra note 18, at 170 (underscoring the crucial role clerks play in the 
litigation process). 
 145. Id. at 170-71. 
 146. See Greacan, supra note 86. 
 147. See Barry, supra note 8, at 1890 (placing the burden on judges to decide whether to 
take into account the fact that a litigant is self-represented when determining whether to 
accept the pro se litigant’s filings as adequate—weighing the right to be heard with the rules 
of procedure). 
 148. Rasnow, supra note 40, at 1309-10 (praising the work of Richard Zorza); Buxton, 
supra note 2, at 106-07 (contrasting pro se assistance in the United States with that of other 
countries); Cantrell, supra note 6, at 1590 (focusing on the effect on the poor). 
 149. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2002-03; Rhode, Access to Justice, 
supra note 35, at 1804 (arguing that the court system, designed by and for lawyers, is biased 
against pro se litigants). 
 150. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2052. 
 151. Henderson, supra note 22, at 575-76 (noting that many pro se litigants also feel as 
though they are not treated with dignity during court proceedings); Rosenbloom, supra note 
66, at 305; Buxton, supra note 2, at 106 (citing the complexity of the judicial system as the 
leading problem for the unrepresented). 
 152. Rosenbloom, supra note 66, at 306. 
 153. Buxton, supra note 2, at 106 (criticizing the system’s strict rules regarding filing of 
pleadings and motions). 
 154. Rosalie R. Young, The Search for Counsel:  Perceptions of Applicants for 
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are further hampered by family or work commitments that restrict the 
amount of time they may have to prepare their case.155 
Victory at trial is rare for pro se litigants despite “romantic notions of pro 
se capacity and judicial paternalism.”156  Judges and court staff, restricted 
in their ability to assist the pro se litigant, “find themselves feeling 
frustrated by the pro se litigant’s inability to grasp legal concepts or to 
comply with the rules of civil procedure.”157  As more and more individuals 
represent themselves, the “duty of the courts to provide fairness and justice 
for all who come before them becomes more and more difficult to 
fulfill.”158 
Due to the combination of large numbers of self-represented litigants and 
huge volume of cases, proponents of greater pro se assistance and 
accommodation maintain that there must be sweeping institutional reforms 
rather than assistance to individual litigants.159  Just as merely having 
access to a law library, even with the assistance of a law librarian, would 
not create a level playing field for a pro se litigant against an experienced 
attorney, neither would mere access to a pro se assistance program.160  
Likewise, merely adding more judges, clerks, and courts will alleviate 
neither the increase of pro se litigants nor the issues they face.161  The 
current approach to pro se assistance was summed up by one commentator 
as:  “while law without lawyers is an increasing possibility for many 
Americans, it is frequently law without justice.”162 
What is needed, proponents of greater pro se assistance and 
accommodation argue, is a re-examination of the roles of court personnel 
and the procedures used.163  Barriers that pro se litigants face must be 
identified systemically, and the traditional rules and roles revised as 
needed.164 
                                                          
Subsidized Legal Assistance, 36 J. FAM. L. 551, 558 (1997) (arguing that while Congress has 
taken some positive steps to provide funding for pro se assistance, more is necessary). 
 155. Henderson, supra note 22, at 575-76 (citing pro se complaints that litigation took 
over their lives). 
 156. Bindra & Ben-Cohen, supra note 6, at 1 (citations omitted) (emphasis omitted). 
 157. Rosenbloom, supra note 66, at 306. 
 158. Deborah J. Chase et al., California’s Family Law Facilitator Program:  A New 
Paradigm, 2 J. CENTER CHILDREN & CTS. 61, 70 (2000). 
 159. Id. at 79 (proposing that pro se assistance programs should expand to adapt to the 
needs of the 21st century). 
 160. Healey, supra note 8, at 146 (arguing that law libraries should provide some 
guidance to pro se litigants and that such guidance does not constitute legal advice). 
 161. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2070. 
 162. Rhode, Connecting, supra note 11, at 404. 
 163. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 1988, 2070; Buxton, supra note 6, at 
118; see Holt, supra note 18, at 173 (expressing an increasing desire by the judiciary to 
educate pro se litigants); Goldschmidt, supra note 13, at 1209 (advocating for the use of 
ghostwriting for pro se litigants). 
 164. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2043; Report of the Working 
Committees to the Second Circuit Task Force on Gender, Racial and Ethnic Fairness in the 
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Until and unless the courts make fundamental changes in their handling 
of unrepresented litigants, these litigants will continue to forfeit 
important legal rights due to their lack of representation.  Improved 
information for unrepresented litigants, increased access to competent 
advice and assistance, and procedural reform to make the courts more 
accessible are important steps in helping unrepresented litigants.  Yet the 
effectiveness of changes such as these will be limited, if not undercut, as 
long as the traditional roles of the judges, clerks, and mediators remain 
unchanged. 
As long as the rules reflect the traditional notion of impartiality, with 
actors limited by the traditional prohibition against giving legal advice, 
the actors will be unable to provide the necessary help.165 
Proponents argue that pro se litigants would be better served by our court 
system if its assistance were rooted in procedural and institutional reforms 
rather than expansion of its current educational programs.166  Until the 
courts make these fundamental changes when dealing with pro se litigation, 
critics maintain that the pro se will continue to forfeit their legal rights due 
to their lack of representation.167 
II. CALLS FOR GREATER ASSISTANCE AND ACCOMMODATION 
Calls for greater assistance and accommodation take two primary forms:  
changing the rules or procedures to be used when pro se litigants come 
before the court and changing the roles of individuals—judges, clerks, and 
even opposing attorneys—who interact with pro se litigants.168 
A. Different Rules for Pro Se Litigants 
In our legal system, the underlying assumption is that justice is preserved 
through court procedures.169  “Yet, as is frequently noted, equal access to 
the justice system is a dubious proposition.  Those who receive their ‘day 
in court’ do not always feel that ‘justice has been done,’ and with 
reason.”170  The court, which does not provide the self-represented civil 
litigant with an attorney, nevertheless holds them to the same standards and 
procedural requirements as an attorney.171  Proponents of greater pro se 
                                                          
Courts, supra note 86, at 383-84 (making a series of recommendations for court reforms). 
 165. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2069. 
 166. Id. at 2069-70; see Buxton, supra note 2, at 137-38 (referencing legal reforms in 
Japan designed to make the legal system more accessible). 
 167. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2069; see Buxton, supra note 2, at 103. 
 168. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2070. 
 169. Rhode, Equal Justice, supra note 31, at 48-49 (questioning accepted notions of 
“equal” access to justice). 
 170. Id. 
 171. See Bradlow, supra note 19, at 664 (theorizing that a court is allowed to deny a pro 
se civil litigant counsel under the current system and then hold that litigant to the same 
standards as a litigant with counsel).  On the other hand, self-represented litigants in 
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assistance and accommodation argue that, by holding them strictly liable, 
the law’s procedural requirements would “place in jeopardy the one due 
process right that pro se litigants clearly have:  the right to a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard.”172 
Easing procedural requirements for the self-represented is already being 
done in limited ways.173  The courts have recognized that pro se litigants 
may require special treatment at different stages of a lawsuit.174  As one 
court stated, “[i]mplicit in the right to self-representation is an 
obligation . . . to make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants 
from inadvertent forfeiture of important rights . . . .” 175  Courts routinely 
provide significant financial assistance to self-represented litigants by 
waiving filing fees.176  For example, eighty-four percent of pro se litigants 
commence civil actions without prepayment of fees.177  Moreover, 
pleadings of the self-represented are generally held to a less stringent 
standard than those of attorneys,178 as it is believed that holding pro se 
litigants’ pleadings to the same standards as those prepared by attorneys 
would frustrate the pro se litigants’ access to the courts.179  These limited 
procedural variations, however, are also criticized by those arguing for 
greater accommodation.  They argue that while accommodating pro se 
litigants’ pleadings furthers their access to the courts, that access can be 
frustrated if they are held to the same procedural requirements as 
represented parties.180  As one observer has noted, “[t]o liberalize pleading 
requirements for pro se litigants to ensure entry into the courthouse and 
then demand rigorous compliance with pretrial procedural rules fosters a 
                                                          
criminal trials, if facing the possibility of imprisonment, can be provided an attorney by the 
court.  Id. at 669. 
 172. Id. at 670.  See generally Holt, supra note 18, at 172 (recognizing a judicial 
obligation to protect pro se litigants but at the same time noting that pro se litigation should 
be encouraged). 
 173. See, e.g., Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that the district 
court erred in allowing forfeiture of a pro se litigant’s claim caused by litigant’s lack of legal 
skills). 
 174. See Bloom & Hershkoff, supra note 13, at 486 (describing situations in which 
courts may provide pro se litigants with special treatment). 
 175. McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 1115 n.37 (quoting Traguth, 710 F.2d at 95 
(emphasis and internal citations omitted)). 
 176. Cf. McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 1130 (citations omitted) (noting that equal 
protection garners similar treatment for similarly situated persons). 
 177. Id. at 1131 n.141. 
 178. See, e.g., Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (per curiam) (“It is settled law that 
the allegations of such a complaint, ‘however inartfully pleaded’ are held ‘to less stringent 
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 
519, 520 (1972))); Madyun v. Thompson, 657 F.2d 868, 876 (7th Cir. 1981) (treating pro se 
plaintiffs more leniently to reflect their lack of legal knowledge and sophistication). 
 179. See McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 1121 (stating that courts have exercised judicial 
paternalism towards pro se litigants). 
 180. Id. at 1121-22 n.78 (discussing at length case comparisons on the subject). 
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tenuous access to the courts.”181 
The suggestion that the rules of procedure and evidence should not apply 
at all to pro se litigants is also nothing new.182  Critics have long claimed 
that “American legal procedures are strewn with unnecessary formalities, 
archaic jargon, and cumbersome rituals that discourage individuals from 
resolving legal problems themselves.”183  Pro se litigants dislike the “rigid 
rules and adversarial nature” of traditional litigation, where any single 
misstep can result in disaster.184  The complex procedure and rules 
minefield often cause pro se litigants to “lose on procedural technicalities, 
not on the merits of their cases.”185  They also argue, contrary to what can 
occur with the claims of represented parties, that the rules should provide 
that pro se complaints should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim 
until after the pro se litigant is allowed an opportunity to correct the 
problem or the court is able to recharacterize the claim for them.186  
Likewise, failing to specify the appropriate relief or name the correct 
parties should not result in the dismissal of a pro se complaint even though 
it would for represented parties.187  Furthermore, proponents argue that 
holding pro se litigants accountable to procedural rules will both deter 
individuals from proceeding pro se, and decrease the likelihood of success 
for those with meritorious claims.188 
It is argued that the rules that govern litigation give represented parties 
an unfair advantage over pro se litigants.189  The advantage comes from the 
fact that attorneys have studied the rules and can operate within their 
framework; individuals who have not studied them and do not understand 
                                                          
 181. Id. at 1121. 
 182. See generally Access to Justice:  Does it Exist in Civil Cases?, supra note 1 
(transcribing a panel discussion at the Georgetown University Law Center in which the 
speaker, Father Robert Drinan, explains how pro se assistance may have extended too far).   
 183. Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 35, at 1816. 
 184. Beck & Sales, supra note 66, at 989. 
 185. Lee, supra note 13, at 1264; see Rasnow, supra note 40, at 1283 (describing the 
rules and procedures of litigation as a “minefield” to those litigants who choose to represent 
themselves); cf. Buxton, supra note 2, at 114 (asserting that pro se litigants are more likely 
to misinterpret and fail to observe judicial rules and procedures). 
 186. Cf. McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 1120 (recognizing that judicial leniency to pro se 
litigants is most often exercised at the pleading stage). 
 187. Cf. Report of the Working Committees to the Second Circuit Task Force on Gender, 
Racial and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts, supra note 86, at 388 (revealing that courts use a 
significant amount of judicial resources in admitting improperly pleaded pro se complaints); 
McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 1120 (arguing that a pro se complaint should not be 
dismissed unless the claim is apparently not supportable by either law or fact). 
 188. Bradlow, supra note 19, at 670 (jeopardizing pro se litigant’s due process rights); 
see Buxton, supra note 2, at 106 (pointing out how pro se litigants often fall through the 
cracks of the legal system). 
 189. John C. Sheldon, The False Idolatry of Rules-Based Law, 56 ME. L. REV. 299, 301 
(2004) (separating society into those that have legal access, and as a result, efficacy, and 
those who do not have such legal access). 
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them have more difficulty during litigation.190  Therefore, “[t]he rules need 
to distinguish between cases involving only unrepresented litigants and 
cases pitting unrepresented litigants against represented ones, since the 
scenarios present different issues for the court system.”191 
Proponents argue that pro se litigants, who are claimed to be unable to 
decipher and understand the rules and are involuntarily representing 
themselves, should not have to follow procedural or evidentiary rules.192  
They argue that for pro se litigants, the principle should be that ignorance 
of the law justifies not following the law.193  Proponents further assert that 
easing and even eliminating procedural requirements is not enough.  They 
argue that prior to trial, rules should be created to restrict attorney conduct 
with pro se litigants during negotiations.194  Some proponents even argue 
that if a pro se litigant relied on any erroneous advice—whether from 
clerks, attorneys, judges, etcetera—it could provide for a basis of relief and 
allow them to relitigate their issues.195 
While rule changes alone are unlikely to eliminate all problems facing 
pro se litigants, “the continued absence of appropriate guidelines tailored to 
context is a gaping hole that must be filled if the courts are serious in their 
efforts to provide unrepresented litigants meaningful access to the 
courts.”196  In summary, “[a] fundamental goal of the adversary system is to 
provide fairness and justice.  Where the operation of the traditional rules 
frustrates that goal, the rules, rather than the goal, must be modified.”197  
Beyond rule and procedural changes, however, some argue that there must 
                                                          
 190. See Lee, supra note 13, at 1268 (stating that pro se litigants have difficulty reading 
procedural rules effectively). 
 191. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2044. 
 192. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 13, at 1270-71 (explaining that the Eighth Circuit follows 
the general rule against ignorance of the law); Bradlow, supra note 19, at 683 (recognizing 
Supreme Court dicta that commands pro se litigants to not ignore relevant rules of 
procedural and substantive law); Bloom & Hershkoff, supra note 13, at 514 (describing the 
judge’s important role as an umpire to ensure the fair nature of a trial); Henderson, supra 
note 22, at 590 (outlining recommendations handed down to the Missouri judicial system in 
enhancing the advice given to pro se litigants).  See generally Jeffrey S. Wolfe & Lisa B. 
Proszek, Interaction Dynamics in Federal Administrative Decision Making:  The Role of the 
Inquisitorial Judge and the Adversarial Lawyer, 33 TULSA L.J. 293, 310 (1997) (discussing 
the role of judges in administrative hearings dealing with pro se parties); Engler, And Justice 
for All, supra note 7, at 2044 (contextualizing the legal issues arising in pro se litigation); 
Goldschmidt, supra note 3, at 44-45 (noting how attorneys offer limited legal advice to pro 
se litigants for smaller fees); Barry, supra note 8, at 1926 (asserting the efficacy of pro se 
clinics). 
 193. See generally Lee, supra note 13, at 1270 (discussing the role of ignorance of the 
law in treating pro se litigants). 
 194. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 148-49 (proposing the enhancement of 
pro se litigants’ rights). 
 195. Id. at 2040 (noting the possibility especially where such misinformation would 
result in a miscarriage of justice). 
 196. Id. at 2044. 
 197. Id. at 1989-90; see, e.g., Harrison, supra note 14, at 70 (illustrating alternative rules 
and procedures for service conducted by pro se litigants). 
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also be institutional changes in the roles of the players in the judicial 
system.198 
B. Changing the Roles of the Judges, Clerks, and Opposing Attorneys 
Proponents of greater pro se assistance and accommodation argue that 
while procedural reform is essential, without changes to the roles of court 
personnel, the effectiveness of any procedural reform will be negated.199  
The Constitution requires that all individuals, whether represented or not, 
have more than mere physical access to the courts; the access must be 
adequate, effective, and meaningful.200  Without assistance from the courts, 
however, proponents argue that pro se litigants “are denied the level of 
access to the courts and protection from the courts granted to parties 
represented by counsel.”201  To ensure that pro se litigants have meaningful 
access, proponents of greater pro se accommodation and assistance argue 
that the courts must affirmatively act to assist them.202  Some proponents 
argue in even stronger terms, stating that judges, clerks, and opposing 
attorneys owe a duty to pro se litigants to ensure that their cases are decided 
on the merits and that this duty extends to pre-trial, trial, and post-trial 
treatment of pro se litigants.203 
1.  Changing the role of the judge 
The proponents argue that the traditional role of the judge developed in 
the context of both parties being represented by attorneys, with there being 
no place in an adversarial system of justice for unrepresented parties.204  
Many times judges effectively ignore the fact that pro se litigants do not 
                                                          
 198. Buxton, supra note 2, at 147 (recommending court sponsored petition drafting and 
mandatory mediation procedures as proper interim institutional reforms). 
 199. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2069 (emphasizing the importance of 
not only an increase of court personnel but also an extension of their roles in assisting pro se 
litigants). 
 200. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 823 (1977); see Lee, supra note 13, at 1274 
(recognizing that courts have required that states provide pro se litigants with services to 
protect individuals’ right to access the courts); McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 1118 (arguing 
that Bounds indicates that states may be required to affirmatively act to protect this right); 
cf. Young, supra note 154, at 553 (asking whether legal access eases the disparity between 
the rich and the poor). 
 201. Holt, supra note 18, at 167. 
 202. See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 1118 (recounting that the Bounds court 
recognized the difficulties involved with pro se litigation and the necessity of affirmative 
state assistance); Hurder, supra note 50, at 2274-75 (providing examples of how judges may 
protect pro se litigants’ right to access courts); Lee, supra note 13, at 1266 (postulating that 
special circumstances can include providing inmates with reasonable access to legal 
research material). 
 203. See Holt, supra note 18, at 167 (exploring the duties owed to pro se litigants by 
various legal actors). 
 204. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 1988 (noting the American legal 
system’s adversarial nature). 
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have counsel, force them to abide by the same rules and procedures that 
govern represented parties, and will do nothing to assist them during 
litigation.205  While the U.S. Supreme Court has held that pro se pleadings 
are to receive special consideration, some believe that many courts do not 
provide pro se litigants with any special treatment.206  “[C]ourts,” it is 
claimed, “have too often been part of the problem, not the solution” of pro 
se assistance.207 
Proponents of greater pro se assistance and accommodation argue that if 
an unrepresented litigant is not getting legal assistance from anyone else, 
the only person left to help them is the judge.208  Regardless of any 
assistance given to pro se litigants outside the court, such assistance is 
meaningless unless judges are willing to help them inside the courtroom,209  
because only the judge is in a position to determine whether a pro se 
litigant is “getting at the substance of their complaints and articulating the 
intervention sought.”210 
Judges should not only want to provide legal assistance to pro se 
litigants,211 but it is argued that it is indeed the judge’s duty to ensure that 
pro se litigants are able to exercise their constitutional right of access to the 
courts,212 are aware of their legal rights,213 are able to present their case,214 
and that cases are decided fairly on the merits despite any mistakes made 
by the pro se litigant.215  They also argue that judges have a duty to protect 
                                                          
 205. Id. at 2013 (revealing that ninety-one percent of judges do not have a stated policy 
regarding the treatment of pro se litigants); Rasnow, supra note 40, at 1283 (discussing the 
reluctance of courts and legislatures to appoint counsel for pro se litigants). 
 206. See Lee, supra note 13, at 1270-71 (underscoring the reluctance of courts to allow 
ignorance to be an excuse for not knowing the law); Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 
7, at 2013 (noting how some courts refuse to advise pro se litigants). 
 207. Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 35, at 1804. 
 208. Cf. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2037-38 (theorizing the dynamics 
between pro se litigants, judges, and clerks). 
 209. Rasnow, supra note 40, at 1309-10 (emphasizing the role of the judge in protecting 
the rights of pro se litigants); McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 1120 (stating that there no is 
point in assisting a pro se litigant in liberally construing pleadings if the court then 
immediately dismisses the complaint on motion of the other party). 
 210. Barry, supra note 8, at 1890. 
 211. Cf. Rhode, Connecting, supra note 11, at 403 (discussing the reasons why judges 
seek and refuse to help pro se litigants). 
 212. Holt, supra note 18, at 168 (identifying the Supreme Court’s decision in Haines v. 
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), which advocated the liberal construction of pro se litigant’s 
pleadings); Lee, supra note 13, at 1263 (stating that both the First Amendment and the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee sufficient access to the courts). 
 213. See, e.g., Margaret Martin Barry, Access To Justice:  On Dialogues with the 
Judiciary, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1089, 1102 (2002) (stating that fairness mandates judges 
to make pro se litigants aware of their rights). 
 214. Id. 
 215. McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 1124-25 (asserting that ascertainment of the truth is 
the goal of a trial, and as such, the judge must seek equitable treatment of pro se litigants); 
Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2028 (proposing that the judge has the 
responsibility of presiding over a fair proceeding); see also Rhode, Access to Justice, supra 
note 35, at 1816 (asserting that courts, in addition to other societal organizations, should 
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pro se litigants from opposing attorneys, especially when the pro se 
litigants are “poor, women, and/or racial and ethnic minorities.”216  More 
troubling is that if the court fails to take on this role, this form of legal 
subjugation can worsen and legitimize the abuse by attorneys. 
Traditionally, judges’ desire to appear impartial prevented them from 
providing effective assistance.217  Proponents for allowing greater judicial 
assistance claim that there is no impartiality in the justice system in that it 
routinely favors parties with lawyers over pro se litigants regardless of the 
merits of their cases.218  Changing our notion of judicial impartiality is 
therefore integral to having judges provide pro se litigant assistance.  
Proponents argue that “[t]he notion that a court cannot provide extensive 
assistance to one party without compromising its impartiality must be 
rejected.  To the contrary, a court may need to provide more help to one 
side than to the other to maintain the impartiality of the proceeding.”219 
Judicial involvement in a hearing is nothing new; judges assist in the 
truth finding process by asking questions or injecting certain matters as 
necessary.220  Proponents of greater judicial assistance assert that actual 
advocacy by the judge for one party would not result in a reversal absent 
actual prejudice against the other party.221  “As long as a court is prepared 
to provide extensive assistance to both parties if necessary, the court will 
maintain its impartiality.”222  Supposedly this principle would also apply to 
parties with counsel, whether the counsel needed the “assistance” or not.223  
Under this new definition of impartiality, the failure to take an active role 
helping the pro se litigant—who is allegedly involuntarily representing him 
or herself—would itself be impartial because the represented party always 
and invariably has an unfair advantage.224  Proponents argue that if the 
                                                          
work together to provide citizens with, at the very least, adequate access to justice). 
 216. Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line:  The Need for Regulation of Lawyers’ 
Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 CAL. L. REV. 79, 147 (1997) [hereinafter 
Engler, Out of Sight]. 
 217. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 1989. 
 218. Id. at 2023 (rejecting the idea that a judge cannot extensively assist one party 
without compromising the judge’s impartiality); see Harrison, supra note 14, at 70. 
 219. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2023.  But see Holt, supra note 18, at 
170 (suggesting that judges must assist self-represented litigants without violating 
traditional notions of impartiality). 
 220. See, e.g., United States v. Pinkey, 548 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir. 1977) (protecting 
the rights of the accused while at the same time upholding the interests of society); Quercia 
v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933) (“[T]he judge is not a mere moderator, but is the 
governor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct and of determining 
questions of law.”); McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 1124-25 (recognizing the judge’s 
obligation to take affirmative steps to ensure a fair trial). 
 221. McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 1124-25 
 222. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2023. 
 223. Cf. id. at 2023 n.174 (defining impartiality as favoring neither and treating all 
alike). 
 224. Id. at 2023, 2028, 2030-31. 
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judge does not assist the pro se litigant in presenting his evidence and 
argument to the court, then regardless of appearances, the result cannot 
truly be impartial.225  While undoubtedly the represented party would 
perceive assistance by the judge as being unfair, proponents argue that it 
merely makes the parties equal since the represented party already has an 
inherently unfair advantage over the pro se litigant.226 
Judges, proponents argue, should provide reasonable assistance to the 
pro se litigant depending upon their needs at any stage before, during, or 
after appearing in court.227  Prior to trial, “[j]udges should be free to instruct 
litigants about the information needed in order to make a decision, and to 
suggest resources for litigants to use in order to explore the full range of 
remedies available to them.”228  Proponents further argue that, before trial, 
judges should conduct pre-trial conferences for pro se litigants 
[T]o review pleadings to determine their sufficiency, to narrow the 
issues, to provide instruction to the litigants regarding such matters as 
pretrial procedures (e.g., motions and discovery) and procedures for 
evidence gathering (i.e., type and proper use of subpoenas), for 
submission of evidence at trial, for preparing instructions in a jury case, 
to explain the order or proof taking, and for the purpose of ruling on all 
evidentiary objections.229 
In reviewing the pleadings, proponents argue that judges should ensure 
that they reflect the pro se litigant’s goals, and allow them to modify them 
if they are legally insufficient.230 
Outside the courtroom, some argue that judges will need to assist pro se 
litigants in their negotiations with attorneys.231  The judge 
                                                          
 225. Zorza, supra note 19, at 431 (diagramming the inequitable results of evenhanded 
treatment by judges in the face of pro se litigants versus represented litigants). 
 226. Goldschmidt, supra note 3, at 48. 
 227. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2030, 2046-47 (stressing the importance 
of particularizing the level of assistance for each pro se litigant); Goldschmidt, supra note 3, 
at 43, 53 (encouraging judges to provide pro se litigants with reasonable assistance); cf. 
Zorza, supra note 19, at 452 (noting that pro se litigants often do not have counsel due to 
financial reasons beyond their control); Holt, supra note 18, at 170 (differentiating between 
legal advice and legal information in what types of assistance judicial clerks may provide to 
pro se litigants); Barry, supra note 8, at 1915 (pointing out factors that might limit the 
assistance provided to pro se litigants, such as family responsibilities and language barriers). 
 228. Barry, supra note 8, at 1926. 
 229. Goldschmidt, supra note 3, at 47; see McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 1125-26 
(requiring a self-represented litigant to submit to the court and opposing counsel the 
questions he wished to ask witnesses at trial, after which the trial judge would then delete 
objectionable questions from the list to enable the pro se litigant to present his case to the 
jury with a minimum of interruptions from objecting counsel (citing Miller v. Los Angeles 
County Bd. of Educ., 799 F.2d 486, 487 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
 230. See, e.g., Hurder, supra note 50, at 2274-75 (explaining how judges may allow pro 
se litigants to amend their pleadings if their original documents do not correctly represent 
their legal goals); McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 1126 (describing how judges oftentimes 
correct a pro se litigant’s mistaken belief in a legal claim). 
 231. See, e.g., Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2029 (urging judges to take an 
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[M]ust help the unrepresented litigant develop the relevant facts and 
identify potential claims and defenses . . . . examine the papers in the 
case and talk to the unrepresented parties to ensure that possible claims 
and defenses are being articulated.  Only by first assessing the merits of 
the case can the judge gain perspective as to what, if any, claims are 
being compromised or waived, whether such waivers truly are knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary, and whether the judge should place the court’s 
imprimatur on the result.232 
The judge, they argue, should be charged with ensuring that the rights of 
the pro se litigant are protected when they negotiate with attorneys and that 
the final agreement is fair.233  Judges should be wary of any 
“misinformation, improper advice, manipulation, or threats” by attorneys 
during negotiations, and refer attorney misconduct to the appropriate 
disciplinary committees.234  While there may be criticism of the court’s 
interference with the pro se litigant’s right to contract, some proponents of 
greater judicial involvement assert that the court’s duty to protect pro se 
litigants from the ever-predatory, malicious attorney must be paramount.235 
During courtroom appearances, proponents of greater judicial assistance 
propose that judges should advise pro se litigants of their “‘statutorily 
granted substantive and procedural remedies.’”236  They argue that the 
judge should assist the self-represented litigant with questions of 
procedure, laying the foundation for and the presentation of evidence, 
understanding issues of law, calling witnesses, conducting direct or cross-
examinations, rebutting objections of opposing attorneys, and developing 
potential claims and defenses.237  Proponents assert that judges should even 
consider conducting limited independent investigations in cases involving 
pro se litigants.238  They argue that throughout the proceeding the judge 
should alert the self-represented litigant of the consequences of failing to 
                                                          
active role on behalf of pro se litigants in their settlement negotiations); Hurder, supra note 
50, at 2275 (discussing how judges may review the settlements entered into by pro se 
litigants to ensure that they are satisfactory). 
 232. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2029. 
 233. Id. (cautioning judges to be wary of any “misinformation, improper advice, 
manipulation, or threats” by attorneys during negotiations, and encouraging judges to refer 
such attorney misconduct to the appropriate disciplinary committees). 
 234. Id. 
 235. See Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2030 (refuting this criticism). 
 236. Harvey Gee, Is a “Hearing Officer” Really a Judge?:  The Presumed Role of 
“Judges” in the Unconstitutional New York Housing Court, 5 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 1, 32 
(2002). 
 237. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2028-30; Goldschmidt, supra note 3, at 
48-49; McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 1225-26; Rasnow, supra note 40, at 1309-10; 
Deborah J. Chase et al., Community Courts and Family Law, 2 J. CENTER CHILDREN & CTS. 
37, 37 (2000); Harrison, supra note 14, at 70 (citing examples of people who suggest judges 
should help do what Chase suggests). 
 238. Goldschmidt, supra note 3, at 49 (stating that Rule 614 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence and many state court procedures provides judges with such power). 
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meet procedural requirements.239  Literally, if at any point the pro se 
litigant appears confused, the judge could step in and provide assistance.240  
Perhaps most importantly, proponents argue that judges should also inform 
a self-represented litigant when an attorney’s help will be necessary in their 
case.241 
Ultimately, proponents of increased judicial assistance for pro se 
litigants argue that 
The heavy responsibility of ensuring a fair trial in . . . a situation 
[involving a pro se litigant] rests directly on the trial judge.  The buck 
stops there . . . . In order that the trial proceed with fairness . . . the judge 
finds that he must explain matters that would normally not require 
explanation and must point out rules and procedures that would normally 
not require pointing out.242 
Unless judges accept this duty, proponents argue that pro se litigants 
“will continue to forfeit important rights due, not to the merits of their 
cases, but to the absence of counsel.”243  Judges, proponents assert, must 
also overcome their loyalty towards the bar and protect pro se litigants 
from attorneys, who for financial reasons want neither pro se assistance nor 
success.244 
2. Changing the duty of the clerk 
Critics of current pro se assistance methods also argue that court 
personnel should give assistance to pro se litigants—including legal 
advice.245  Rules that still prohibit such advice—while supposedly designed 
to protect the pro se litigant—merely deprive them of the assistance they 
need and therefore must be repealed.246  At least one proponent argues that 
                                                          
 239. Cf. United States v. Cornfeld, 563 F.2d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 
U.S. 922 (1978) (“The trial judge may question witnesses to clear up ambiguities . . . .”); 
Holt, supra note 18, at 169-70 (noting how the failure to clear up ambiguities undermines a 
pro se litigant’s right to legal access). 
 240. Parisie v. Greer, 705 F.2d 882, 898 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 918 
(1983) (asserting an implicit duty on judges to clarify pro se confusion); see Ross v. 
Franzen, 777 F.2d 1216, 1219 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[I]f defense counsel does not give pro se 
prisoner litigants such notice, the district court must do so.”) (emphasis omitted); cf. Gordon 
v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1152-53 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978) (“A 
district court is not required to act as an advocate for a pro se litigant; but . . . should afford 
him a reasonable opportunity to determine the correct person . . . against whom the claim is 
asserted, [and] advise him how to proceed. . . .”). 
 241. Cf. Hurder, supra note 50, at 2274-75 (describing ways in which judges may assist 
pro se litigants). 
 242. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2014 (alteration in original) (citations 
omitted). 
 243. Id. at 1991. 
 244. Goldschmidt, supra note 3, at 44. 
 245. See Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2036 (suggesting law clerks or a 
new position to handle such matters). 
 246. Id. at 2026 (describing the prohibition as protective of pro se litigants so they do not 
receive legal advice from non-lawyers). 
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prohibitions against the unauthorized practice of law should not apply to 
clerks and court personnel, as they would be giving legal advice for free 
and under the auspices of the court, which would not be considered the 
unauthorized practice of law.247 
How much assistance should be given by clerks depends on the needs of 
the pro se litigants and the particular courts.248  While some are critical of 
this approach, claiming clerks, not being attorneys, would be destined to 
provide bad advice;249 proponents for having clerks provide advice argue 
that the solution “should be to improve the quality of the advice, rather than 
eliminate the advice-giving.”250  Just as with judges, it would be necessary 
to develop detailed guidelines as to the types of assistance clerks will be 
required to provide for pro se litigants so as to ensure the latter’s access to 
the courts.251 
3. Duties of attorneys to pro se litigants 
Just as with judges and clerks, some argue that attorneys appearing in 
cases against a pro se litigant owe them special duties and obligations as 
well.252  The first of these, some proponents claim, is to stop resisting 
efforts to assist pro se litigants.  They claim that attorneys—and the judges 
who they influence and help elect—resist changes to the traditional 
adversarial rules and roles because any change that helps pro se litigants 
prevail more often, damages attorneys financially.253  Instead of wanting 
pro se litigants to be handicapped during litigation, proponents for greater 
pro se assistance and accommodation argue that an attorney’s obligation 
should be to embrace efforts to change the justice system to benefit pro se 
litigants.254 
Secondly, proponents argue that attorneys must change how they behave 
when negotiating with pro se litigants.  “The ‘pro se problem’ should be 
more properly recognized as an ‘attorney problem’ of rampant misconduct 
during negotiations.”255  Attorneys, it is claimed, often mislead pro se 
                                                          
 247. Id. at 2040-41. 
 248. Id. at 2038; Holt, supra note 18, at 170 (contextualizing the types of advice that 
may be given so as to determine what types of advice clerks may appropriately provide). 
 249. Cf. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2026 (describing the reluctance of 
courts to allow non-attorneys to provide legal advice). 
 250. Id. at 2039. 
 251. See Holt, supra note 18, at 171, 173 (underscoring the importance of establishing 
guidelines for advising pro se litigants). 
 252. Goldschmidt, supra note 3, at 44-45 (suggesting that attorneys offer tailored legal 
advice for smaller fees). 
 253. Id. at 44; Deborah L. Rhode, Colloquium, What Does it Mean to Practice Law “In 
the Interests of Justice” in The Twenty-First Century?:  Keynote Law, Lawyers, and the 
Pursuit of Justice, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1543, 1553 (2002) [hereinafter Rhode, Colloquium] 
(noting the incentives against championing pro se interests). 
 254. Id. 
 255. Engler, Out of Sight, supra note 216, at 130 (noting that such misconduct increases 
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litigants as to both the facts and the governing law in a case.256  Proponents 
argue that “[l]awyers present legal and factual issues in a strategically 
favorable light, selectively control the flow of information, and manipulate 
their unrepresented adversary by misusing argument, appeals, threats, and 
promises.  Whatever assistance an unrepresented litigant has received may 
be undercut by the litigant’s encounter with the opposing lawyer.”257  
Proponents argue that rules therefore need to be created that limit what 
attorneys can say and do during negotiations with pro se litigants, even if it 
hinders settlement of the case.258  These rules should prevent attorneys 
from exploiting the ignorance of pro se litigants, requiring them to disclose 
to pro se litigants facts and claims necessary to the pro se litigant to allow 
them to make an informed decision about their own case, such as the 
disclosure attorneys must make to the court in ex parte proceedings.259  
These rules would differ from those where the other party is represented by 
counsel, and would place on the attorney a duty of fairness when 
negotiating with pro se litigants to prevent unconscionable agreements.260  
Proponents further assert such a duty would also need to apply during 
discovery efforts.261 
Finally, some argue that attorneys should be required to help individuals 
who otherwise would be forced to proceed pro se.  Attorneys should be 
willing to charge less for individuals who earn less, allowing the client’s 
income to determine the fee instead of the complexity or time commitment 
of the case.262  In the alternative, some argue it might be better to merely 
force all attorneys to perform a mandatory number of pro bono cases.263 
C. Eliminating the Adversarial System of Justice 
Ultimately, what many proponents of greater pro se assistance and 
accommodation seem to be seeking is an abandonment of the adversarial 
system of justice—at least when pro se litigants are before the court.  
Under the adversarial system, justice is presumed to be achieved through 
                                                          
where courts apply additional pressure to settle). 
 256. See Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 35, at 1816 (arguing that attorneys should 
be enjoined from exploiting ignorant clients by knowingly misleading them). 
 257. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2006. 
 258. Engler, Out of Sight, supra note 216, at 138. 
 259. Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 35, at 1816. 
 260. See Engler, Out of Sight, supra note 216, at 138 (arguing that it is preferable to err 
on the side of protecting the unrepresented party). 
 261. See Hurder, supra note 50, at 2276 (asserting that the courts have a compelling 
interest in preventing lawyers’ abuse of judicial power). 
 262. Goldschmidt, supra note 3, at 45.   
 263. See Engler, Out of Sight, supra note 216, at 153 (reasoning that the legal profession 
has the authority to use pro bono requirements to target the supply of counsel to particular 
groups of clients). 
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an equal contest of contrary interests,264 in which both sides have a 
responsibility to “focus, develop, and present all relevant facts and legal 
arguments to the court.”265  Representation “promotes equality among 
unequal litigants.”266  Some believe that equality of representation is the 
cornerstone of procedural justice, which in turn is the foundation of 
substantive justice.267  Proponents of greater pro se assistance and 
accommodation assert that the notion of an equal contest, however, is 
completely upset when one side is pro se—with the pro se party at a 
complete disadvantage.268  They further argue that pro se litigants pose a 
fundamental challenge to the basic assumptions of the adversarial system 
of justice—a system of rules and roles designed by judges and lawyers 
which assume both parties have lawyers.269  “When both sides appear 
without counsel, the traditional configuration of the adversarial system has 
been altered; when one side is represented and the other is not, it has 
broken down.”270  Just as “there can be no equal justice where the kind of 
trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has,”271 some 
proponents argue that there cannot be justice if the system works only for 
the represented.272 
In summary, proponents for greater pro se assistance and 
accommodation argue that since the system designed to achieve justice is 
premised on parties being represented, if parties are not represented the 
goal of justice should not be changed, but rather the system designed to 
achieve it.273 
                                                          
 264. McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 1123-24; Young, supra note 154. 
 265. Kim, supra note 31, at 1644; see SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RACE AND ETHNICITY, 64 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 189, 266 (1996) (stating that “[t]hese parties suffer a disadvantage in an 
adversary system that relies on the parties themselves to evaluate and present their claims.”); 
McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 1123-24 (emphasizing that it is traditionally the lawyer’s 
role, rather than the judge’s, to frame the issues and propel the contest). 
 266. Young, supra note 154, at 558 (citations omitted). 
 267. Id.; see also McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 1123-24 (noting the adversarial system 
presumes a contest between equals). 
 268. Id.; see also Kim, supra note 31, at 1644 (concluding that the adversarial system 
may be unfair for those who cannot afford counsel and cannot adequately represent 
themselves). 
 269. See Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 1988, 2022, 2069 (suggesting that 
pro se litigants may be advantaged or disadvantaged, depending on the circumstances and 
accommodation by the court). 
 270. Id. at 2022; see also Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 826 (1977) (holding that 
access to a law library is an essential factor in considering whether a pro se litigant has had a 
fair chance to present his case). 
 271. See Rhode, Equal Justice, supra note 31, at 55 (quoting the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956)). 
 272. See, e.g., id. at 61 (arguing that courts should at least consider whether 
unrepresented parties received “adequate justice,” since access to equal justice is an 
implausible ideal). 
 273. See Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2023 (suggesting that it makes no 
sense to alter the goal of achieving justice simply to justify retention of existing rules). 
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If the courts hold out the promise of fairness and justice, but claim for 
practical reasons to be unable to achieve such a result, the advertising is 
false.  It is hypocritical to claim to provide fairness to everyone through 
a system that is not prepared to do so for those without lawyers.274 
While eliminating the adversarial system would not eliminate all of the 
problems faced by the unrepresented litigant, without doing so some argue 
that there can be no meaningful access for the unrepresented to the 
courts.275 
D. The False Assumption as to Why Individuals are Pro Se276 
The foundation for many of the arguments for greater accommodation 
and assistance for pro se litigants is the belief that the vast majority of pro 
se litigants are forced to represent themselves because they cannot afford 
counsel.277  Unfortunately, the available data undermines this contention.  
While certainly there are many individuals who cannot afford counsel and 
must represent themselves in court, there are likewise many who, for a 
variety of reasons, choose to proceed pro se.  For instance, in one survey, 
forty-five percent of pro se litigants stated that they chose to represent 
themselves because the case was simple, not because they could not afford 
an attorney; only thirty-one percent were pro se because they could not 
afford to retain counsel.278  Almost half had the necessary funds to retain 
counsel, but chose not to.279  Some litigants who could afford counsel 
                                                          
 274. Id. at 2031. 
 275. See id. at 2044 (asserting that development of rules for cases where only one party 
is unrepresented is necessary to remedy the “gaping hole” in the existing system). 
 276. See generally Swank, supra note 5 (exploring at greater length the myths and 
realities of why parties choose to represent themselves). 
 277. See Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2027 (stating that “[a]lthough some 
litigants who could afford counsel refrain from doing so, the notion that most litigants 
choose to forego legal representation is fictitious in many contexts” and “a litigant’s 
appearance without counsel must be presumed to be coerced, rather than voluntary.”); supra 
notes 19-25 and accompanying text (surveying the common belief that pro se litigants 
forego counsel because of cost considerations). 
 278. Bruce D. Sales et al., Is Self-Representation a Reasonable Alternative to Attorney 
Representation in Divorce Cases?, 37 ST. LOUIS L.J. 553, 567 (1993); see Berenson, supra 
note 13, at 119 (concluding that many middle income litigants forego legal representation in 
simpler, less serious cases even though they would pay for representation in criminal cases); 
Rhode, Connecting, supra note 11, at 399-400 (attributing the increase in self-representation 
to the increased availability of do-it-yourself legal resources, cut-backs in legal aid, and 
simplification of certain legal procedures); Greacen, supra note 13, at 3-5 (reviewing studies 
from various states finding divergent trends in income, gender, and education of self-
represented litigants).  But see Deborah L. Neveils, Florida’s Vexatious Litigant Law:  An 
End to the Pro Se Litigant’s Courtroom Capers?, 25 NOVA L. REV. 343, 346 (2000) (stating 
only twenty percent of pro se litigants can afford counsel but simply do not want to be 
represented); Henderson, supra note 22, at 573-74 (citing a direct correlation between the 
increase in divorce litigation costs and the numbers of litigants who chose self 
representation). 
 279. See Graecen, supra note 13, at 3 (noting that in one study almost half of pro se 
litigants had annual incomes of more than $30,000, and many had incomes over $50,000).  
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indicated that they would rather spend their money on other things.280  
There are many reasons for the growth of pro se litigation other than the 
cost of securing legal assistance.  They include:  (1) increased literacy rates 
and education;281 (2) increased sense of consumerism;282 (3) increased 
sense of individualism and belief in one’s own abilities;283 (4) an anti-
lawyer sentiment;284 (5) a mistrust of the legal system;285 (6) a belief that 
the public defender in criminal cases is overburdened;286 (7) a belief that 
nothing can be done about the situation;287 (8) a belief that the court will do 
what is right whether the party is represented or not;288 (9) a belief that 
litigation has been simplified to the point that attorneys are not needed;289 
(10) the advent of do-it-yourself publications, kits, and websites;290 (11) a 
desire to save money and not share proceeds with an attorney;291 and 
(12) as a trial strategy designed to gain either sympathy292 or a procedural 
advantage over represented parties.293 
                                                          
But see Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2027 (stating although some litigants 
who could afford counsel refrain from doing so, the notion that most litigants choose to 
forego legal representation is fictitious in many contexts). 
 280. See Berenson, supra note 13, at 119 (recalling that in one study twenty-two percent 
of pro se litigants could afford a lawyer but chose not to retain one); Sales, supra note 278, 
at 567 (presenting the complete data from the study cited by Berenson). 
 281. Goldschmidt, supra note 3, at 36; see also Mike Jay Garcia, Key Trends In The 
Legal Profession, 71 FLA. BAR J. 16, 20 (1997) (discussing how personal computers and 
Court TV have led to the increase of pro se litigants). 
 282. See id. (observing that clients have become more questioning and demanding). 
 283. See id. (describing one lawyer-authored book that aimed to imbue the reader with 
confidence by thoroughly explaining every step of the courtroom process); Healey, supra 
note 8, at 133 (suggesting some pro se litigants may have a blind belief in their own 
innocence and in the ability of the court to see their innocence); Sales et al., supra note 278, 
at 597 (positing that with proper forms and instructions the vast majority of people who 
wish to self-represent are capable of doing so). 
 284. Goldschmidt, supra note 3, at 1145; see also Bradlow, supra note 19, at 661-62 
(noting many pro se litigants may harbor a mistrust of counsel); Greacen, supra note 13, at 4 
(citing the belief that lawyers cause cases to be delayed); Healey, supra note 8, at 132 
(referring to mistrust of lawyers and of the legal system in general); Berenson, supra note 
13, at 122 (suggesting that litigants believe lawyers try to prevent amicable settlements and 
to drag out cases in order to increase their billable hours); Williams, supra note 12, at 816 
(citing the belief that lawyers are incompetent and dishonest); Garcia, supra note 281, at 20 
(referring to a general public suspicion of lawyers). 
 285. See Nichols, supra note 31, at 380 (noting many pro se litigants believe the system 
is inherently unjust); Healey, supra note 8, at 133. 
 286. Bradlow, supra note 19, at 661-62. 
 287. Rhode, Connecting, supra note 11, at 381. 
 288. See Healey, supra note 8, at 133 (referring to litigants’ attitude toward the court as 
“blind belief”). 
 289. Id. at 132; see also Williams, supra note 12, at 816 (citing pro se litigants who 
watch “Judge Judy” and believe it is simple to represent oneself). 
 290. Goldschmidt, supra note 3, at 1145. 
 291. Williams, supra note 12, at 816; Healey, supra note 8, at 132-33; see also Sales et 
al., supra note 278, at 567 (noting twenty-two percent of respondents said they had money 
to hire an attorney but preferred not to do so). 
 292. See Bradlow, supra note 19, at 662 (explaining that the accused may want create the 
image of a “lone defendant against the mammoth state”). 
 293. See Healey, supra note 8, at 133 (explaining that self-representation may enhance a 
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Still another reason why individuals are pro se is that they are advised to 
proceed on their own.294  According to one survey in Idaho, thirty-one 
percent of pro se litigants consulted counsel before trial and were advised 
either that their case was simple enough that they could handle it on their 
own, or by virtue of being uncontested, that they did not need an 
attorney.295  Some pro se litigants, based upon repeated experiences with 
the legal system, may actually be able to represent themselves better in 
court than with counsel.296  Most telling of all, according to one study, 
“[seventy-two percent] of pro se litigants indicated they would choose to 
represent themselves again in the future.”297  Not only are many pro se 
litigants choosing to represent themselves, they are choosing to do so again 
and again. 
In some rural locations, even if a litigant is able to and wishes to hire an 
attorney there may be none to be found.298  Likewise, there are some areas 
of the law in which very few attorneys practice, such as landlord tenant 
disputes and certain family law issues, resulting in litigants needing to 
represent themselves.299  Ultimately, it may be the simplicity of the cases 
and the nature of the jurisdiction, more than the characteristics of the 
litigants, that determines whether individuals represents themselves or 
not.300  It is important to note, however, that the only thing all pro se 
litigants have in common is that they have nothing in common.301  
According to available research, education and income levels vary widely 
among pro se litigants.302  Some studies indicate that on average pro se 
litigants are younger than represented parties, have on average one to three 
years of college education, and have previously represented themselves.303  
                                                          
litigant’s opportunities for delay, mistrial, and confrontation of witnesses). 
 294. Thompson, supra note 79, at 1316. 
 295. Id. 
 296. See Healey, supra note 8, at 133 (suggesting that some litigants may have more 
court experience than some court appointed attorneys). 
 297. Beck & Sales, supra note 66, at 1039; see Sales et al., supra note 13, at 603-04 
(noting that only a slightly higher percentage, seventy-nine percent, of attorney-represented 
clients would choose the same method of representation again). 
 298. See Thompson, supra note 79, at 1315 (observing that most Idaho attorneys live in 
cities, leaving a scarcity of lawyers in rural areas); Harrison, supra note 14, at 75 (reporting 
high utilization of family law facilitators by pro se litigants in rural areas). 
 299. See Thompson, supra note 79, at 1315 (explaining that the areas of law in which 
litigants most often self-represent are the areas with the greatest scarcity of lawyers); Engler, 
And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2016 (citing the shortage of available lawyers for the 
poor). 
 300. See Sales et al., supra note 278, at 598 (indicating that litigants are less likely to self 
represent in divorce cases involving children because of the complex issues involved). 
 301. See Flaherty, supra note 101, at 92 (noting that people with different incomes and 
educational backgrounds opt for self representation); Henderson, supra note 22, at 574 
(suggesting that there is no typical pro se litigant). 
 302. Flaherty, supra note 101, at 92; Henderson, supra note 22, at 574. 
 303. See id. (explaining that pro se litigants are likely to have at least one predictive 
characteristic, such as youth, lower income, and experience with self-representation); Sales 
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Other studies indicate that individuals with less education are more likely 
to be pro se.304  Just as there is little consensus as to the profile of an 
“average” pro se litigant, as shown above, there is little consensus as to 
why people represent themselves in court.305  Regardless of why they 
represent themselves, pro se litigants have shown to be more 
knowledgeable about their rights than originally thought to be.306 
The arguments that pro se litigants should be given even more 
accommodation and assistance in court would be much stronger if it could 
be shown that the majority of pro se litigants are involuntarily representing 
themselves, versus doing so by choice.307  If most, or even a substantial 
portion of pro se litigants, are choosing to represent themselves even 
though they have the means to hire counsel, why should the fundamental 
elements of the adversarial system of justice—such as the roles of the 
judge, clerk, rules of procedure and evidence—be altered? 
E. The False Belief that Having Counsel Guarantees Access to Justice 
The second fundamental flaw with the arguments advocating greater 
accommodation and assistance for pro se litigants hinges on the belief that 
“justice” is accessible only to those litigants with attorneys.308  The harsh 
reality, however, is that justice is often inaccessible even for those with 
representation.  All too often, attorneys fail to file matters, miss deadlines, 
or make other mistakes that prevent their clients’ issues from being 
litigated on the merits.309  Cases are legion of attorneys failing to lay proper 
                                                          
et al., supra note 278, at 562 (indicating that in one study only eight percent of litigants 
under thirty years of age retained a lawyer). 
 304. See id. (finding that those with less education were more likely to self-represent, but 
only because, and to the extent, that their incomes were lower). 
 305. See Stanoch, supra note 13, at 297 (indicating that no one seems certain whether the 
increase is due to cuts in legal aid or perceptions of litigants that they can handle their cases 
without lawyers). 
 306. See Sales et al., supra note 278, at 574-76 (finding that self-represented litigants 
understood their rights as well as attorney-represented clients). 
 307. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 22, at 573 (advocating increased assistance to pro 
se divorce litigants given a study that showed seventy-two percent had forgone 
representation because they could not afford it). 
 308. See Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2030-31 (rejecting criticisms of 
more active roles for judges when one litigant self-represents); Young, supra note 154, at 
558 (suggesting that legal representation is critical for a fair trial); Henderson, supra note 
22, at 575-76 (noting that the complexity of court processes and forms is a major barrier to 
pro se litigants); Rosenbloom, supra note 66, at 305 (observing that pro se litigants are often 
overwhelmed by the complexity of both procedural and substantive aspects of the law); 
Buxton, supra note 2, at 106 (explaining that pleading requirements in Federal courts are 
especially daunting to the unrepresented layman); Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 35, 
at 1786 (calling the lack of legal assistance shameful); Lee, supra note 13, at 1266 
(surveying the procedural pitfalls faced by pro se litigants); Bindra & Ben-Cohen, supra 
note 6, at 1 (noting that victory for pro se litigants is rare). 
 309. See, e.g., H. Keith Morrison, Legal Malpractice:  The Law in Arkansas and Ways to 
Avoid Its Reach, 55 ARK. L. REV. 267, 292 (2002) (indicating that malpractice most often 
arises in the context of litigation, such as when lawyers miss deadlines). 
SWANK OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  2:46:15 PM 
2005] IN DEFENSE OF RULES AND ROLES 1575 
foundation310 or of not understanding the rules of evidence,311 and yet no 
one calls for the overhaul of the legal system because of it.  Even a casual 
review of both criminal and civil cases will give examples of attorneys who 
are asleep, inebriated, or otherwise incoherent while representing their 
clients in court.312  According to one source, for the approximately 35,000 
clients who filed legal malpractice claims last year, and especially for the 
12,000 (thirty-four percent) who recovered monetarily from their attorney, 
having a lawyer did not guarantee their ability to have access to justice.313  
These numbers are merely the tip of the iceberg:  “[m]ost litigation 
misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel goes unreported and 
unremedied.”314  For these clients and the thousands that did not file 
malpractice claims, there is often little redress for their attorney misconduct 
except against the attorney themselves—and as shown by the statistics, 
these actions are unlikely to prevail.315 
                                                          
 310. See, e.g., Kesel v. UPS, 339 F.3d 849, 850 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the plaintiff 
had failed to show defendant’s failure to comply with released valuation doctrine); United 
States v. Schnapp, 322 F.3d 564, 573 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that the defendant had failed 
to show why impeachment testimony should not have been excluded); Alston v. King, 231 
F.3d 383, 383 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that a city sanitation director had failed to show he 
would not have been fired even if he had been given due process). 
 311. See, e.g., People v. Pickens, 446 Mich. 298, 303 (1994) (holding that despite 
defense attorney’s failure to comply with rules of evidence, defendant was not denied 
effective assistance of counsel). 
 312. See, e.g., Meredith J. Duncan, The (So-Called) Liability of Criminal Defense 
Attorneys:  A System in Need of Reform, 2002 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2002) (surveying 
extreme cases of attorney incompetence); Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 35, at 1800 
(stating “[c]onvictions have been upheld where lawyers spent less time preparing for trial 
than the average American spends showering before work”). 
 313. See Statistics on Legal Malpractice, at http://www.legal-malpractice-lawyers-
attorneys.com/legal_malpractice_statistics.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2005) (on file with the 
American University Law Review) (explaining that the largest number of malpractice 
claims arose in personal injury cases). 
 314. See Rhode, Colloquium, supra note 253, at 1556. 
 315. See Bell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 214 F.3d 798, 802 (7th Cir. 2000) (dismissing an 
appeal on the basis of untimely filing by the plaintiff’s lawyer); Stanciel v. Gramley, 267 
F.3d 575, 581 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding attorney’s deficient performance did not warrant 
retrial); Sparrow v. Harlan Heller, 116 F.3d 204, 206 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding plaintiffs were 
not entitled to relief from judgment because error in asserting jurisdiction was due to 
inexcusable attorney negligence); Beaudry & Pischke v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 331 F.3d 
1164, 1169 (10th Cir. 2003) (ruling that plaintiffs could not assert ineffective assistance of 
counsel because no Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists in civil cases); Cottman v. 
Aurora Pub. Sch., 85 Fed. Appx. 83, 88 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that plaintiffs were not 
entitled to appeal or retrial where attorney failed to provide trial transcript to appellate 
court); Castrodad-Soto v. Rivera-Sanchez, 103 Fed. Appx. 401, 401 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(affirming trial court’s dismissal of suit without considering allegations that prior counsel 
was negligent); Robinson v. S. Foods Group, 93 Fed. Appx. 176, 177 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(holding plaintiffs’ attorney’s incompetence was not a basis for reversing judgment); Glick 
v. Henderson, 855 F.2d 536, 541 (8th Cir. 1988) (ruling that proper remedy for alleged 
incompetence of plaintiffs’ attorney would be a malpractice suit rather than a warrant for a 
new civil rights action); MacCuish v. United States, 844 F.2d 733, 735 (10th Cir. 1988) 
(holding that plaintiff was misapplying the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in seeking a 
new trial in a civil suit); Rhode, Colloquium, supra note 253, at 1555-56 (stating that ninety 
percent of bar complaints against attorneys are dismissed, and less than two percent result in 
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Even in clear cases of attorney misconduct there is seldom an 
opportunity to have a case reheard by a court.  In criminal matters, ninety-
nine percent of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were 
unsuccessful in overturning a verdict and getting a new trial.316  It is even 
worse for civil litigants.  As there is generally no constitutional right to 
counsel in civil cases, there can be no constitutional right to effective 
assistance of counsel in a civil case.317  Ineffective assistance of counsel in 
a civil case is not grounds for overturning a judgment, as it is in a criminal 
case.  As stated by the Supreme Court in Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., a 
party’s mistake of choosing the wrong person to represent them in court 
cannot serve as grounds to re-litigate the case; the party made a choice as to 
their representation, and if that choice was a bad one the other party should 
not be penalized.318  This logic is true whether the person hired an attorney 
or had one appointed for them.319 
Even when attorneys make no mistakes, their clients can be denied 
“justice.”  An example of this is the fact that innocent individuals are 
sometimes convicted and incarcerated—perhaps even executed—for 
crimes they did not commit, regardless of how well their attorneys 
represented them.320  Normally these cases come to light through the use of 
                                                          
public sanctions). 
 316. Rhode, Equal Justice, supra note 31, at 55 (referring to results from one study 
published in 1995). 
 317. See, e.g., United States v. Sardone, 94 F.3d 1233, 1236 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that 
alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in a prior civil action did not require dismissal of a 
related criminal indictment); Helm v. Resolution Trust Corp., 84 F.3d 874 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(ruling that a mortgager was not entitled to relief from judgment because attorney’s 
inexcusable negligence was not an exceptional circumstance); Sparrow, 116 F.3d at 206-07 
(holding that attorney’s negligence in failing to assert proper jurisdictional amount did not 
entitle plaintiff to relief from adverse judgment), Stanciel, 267 F.3d at 580 (deciding 
plaintiff prisoner was not entitled to a retrial despite alleged attorney negligence); Beaudry 
& Pischke, 331 F.3d at 1164 (expressing confusion over the theory pressed by appellants 
and reminding them that there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in civil cases); 
Babcock v. Town of Camp Verde, 103 Fed. Appx. 309, (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting 
appellant’s contention that ineffective assistance of counsel represented a violation of his 
federally protected rights); Cottman, 85 Fed. Appx. at 83 (holding that ineffective assistance 
of counsel cannot form a basis of appeal in a civil case); Mayo v. Fowler Fitness, 110 Fed. 
Appx. 69, 71 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding in a discrimination case that an appellate court 
cannot reverse trial court’s ruling on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel because 
there is no right to counsel in such civil cases); Robinson, 93 Fed. Appx. at 176 (affirming 
the lower court’s dismissal of a racial discrimination case and rejecting appellant’s assertion 
of ineffective assistance of counsel); Glick, 855 F.2d at 536 (holding there is no 
constitutional or statutory right to counsel in civil cases); MacCuish, 844 F.2d at 733 
(holding any incompetence by lawyer in medical malpractice case could not warrant a new 
trial). 
 318. 370 U.S. 626, 634 (1962). 
 319. See Glick, 855 F.2d at 536 (reasoning that since there is no constitutional right to 
appointed counsel in civil cases, there can be no right to effective counsel if an attorney is in 
fact appointed). 
 320. See Peter Neufeld, Symposium, Preventing the Execution of the Innocent:  
Testimony Before the House Judiciary Committee, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1155, 1155 (2001) 
(recalling that there have been at least sixty-seven post-conviction exonerations based on 
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DNA evidence, and sometimes cost taxpayers millions of dollars in efforts 
to compensate the wronged-individual.321  In San Francisco, one judge 
recently refused to hear a case regarding same-sex marriage because the 
petition had a semi-colon instead of a comma.322  While the judge’s 
statement that “I am not trying to be petty here, but it is a big deal.  That 
semicolon is a big deal”323 was in all likelihood a disingenuous attempt to 
avoid a highly controversial political issue, it nevertheless reflects an 
instance of when represented parties were denied access to justice for 
having the audacity of using a semi-colon in a pleading. 
Despite the assertion that only with counsel can a litigant have 
meaningful access to the courts, the reality is that, for many litigants, even 
with proficient (let alone deficient) counsel, they are denied meaningful 
access or true “justice.”324  Calls for greater assistance and accommodation 
for pro se litigants to “level the playing field”325 between pro se and 
represented parties are therefore inappropriate.  For example, pro se 
litigants should not be allowed to relitigate based on errors they made326—
                                                          
DNA evidence); Barry C. Scheck, Symposium, Preventing the Execution of the Innocent:  
Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1165, 1165 (2001) 
(emphasizing that DNA evidence has helped identify the guilty and exonerate the innocent); 
Jean Coleman Blackerby, Life After Death Row:  Preventing Wrongful Capital Convictions 
and Restoring Innocence After Exoneration, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1179 (2003) (noting that 
more than 100 death row inmates have been released pursuant to evidence of innocence 
since 1973).  The result can be even more prevalent when attorneys make mistakes in capital 
cases.  See Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 35, at 1800 (stating that “defendants have 
been executed despite their lawyers’ lack of any prior trial experience, ignorance of all 
relevant death penalty precedents, or failure to present any mitigating evidence.”). 
 321. See Holly Schaffter, Postconviction DNA Evidence:  A 500 Pound Gorilla in State 
Courts, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 695, 695 (2002) (heralding DNA evidence as a revolutionary 
forensic technique); Karen Christian, “And the DNA Shall Set You Free”:  Issues 
Surrounding Postconviction DNA Evidence and the Pursuit of Innocence, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1195, 1195 (2001) (arguing that convicts should automatically be granted DNA testing and 
a hearing in the case of favorable results); Craig M. Cooley, Tort Reform and the 
Erroneously Convicted:  Compensating For Lost Time and [Possibly Lost Lives], at 
http://www.law-forensic.com/tort_reform_wrongly_convicted.htm (last visited Aug., 15, 
2005) (on file with the American University Law Review) (surveying various wrongful 
convictions and subsequent attempts to receive compensation). 
 322. See Kevin Drum, Courtroom News, at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/arc 
hives/individual/2004_02/003296.php (Feb. 17, 2004) (on file with the American University 
Law Review) (documenting the judge’s comments and posting various readers’ reactions). 
 323. Id. 
 324. See Christian, supra note 321, at 1195 (describing the extent of wrongful 
convictions even where ineffective assistance of counsel was not alleged). 
 325. Esquivel, supra note 21, at 101; see Sheldon, supra note 189 (arguing that 
evidentiary rules should be disregarded in non-jury trials in order to make courts more 
accessible to non-lawyers); Goldschmidt, supra note 3, at 1158 (arguing that lawyers and 
legal assistants should be permitted to “ghost write” pleadings for pro se litigants); Rhode, 
Access to Justice, supra note 11, at 402 (lamenting the lack of effective access to courts for 
battered women without lawyers); Holt, supra note 18, at 167 (advocating for courts to 
provide greater assistance to pro se litigants); Rosenbloom, supra note 66, at 380 (stating 
“[t]he argument is that a pro se party is at such a disadvantage when opposing a represented 
party that judicial intervention may be warranted to maintain a level playing field.”). 
 326. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text (reviewing arguments that 
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even if the mistake was based on bad advice—just as represented parties 
cannot.  The other party should not have to litigate a matter twice merely 
because a party is pro se.  Pro se litigants should neither garner a tactical 
advantage by proceeding pro se, nor obviously suffer any systemic 
impairment.327  As one commentator wrote, “[i]f a represented litigant will 
be held accountable for the procedural mistakes of his lawyer, then why 
afford a pro se litigant more protection . . . ?”328  Pro se litigants should be 
treated the same as represented litigants, for in the “eyes of the law” all 
litigants are equal.329 
Clearly, many if not most pro se litigants will not be as articulate, nor as 
versed in procedural or substantive law as attorneys.330  But not all 
attorneys are equal.  There is no handicapping system to hold back a better 
attorney when litigating against an inferior one; some attorneys are better 
prepared, harder working, and more able than others.  As Judge Posner 
once stated: 
“The court states:  An underlying assumption of the adversarial system is 
that both parties will have roughly equal legal resources.”  This has 
never been an assumption of the adversarial system.  We do not put a cap 
on the amount of money that a litigant can spend on lawyers; we do not 
inquire whether the litigants had roughly equal legal resources; we allow 
one to outspend the other by as much as he pleases.  We count on the 
courts not to be overawed by the litigant with the higher-priced 
counsel.331 
Likewise, not all pro se litigants are equal—some will do better in court 
than others.332  Some will be prepared and coherent, others might just show 
up.  “While a pro se litigant is not necessarily on equal terms with a litigant 
who is well represented, he may well be on such terms with a litigant who 
is poorly represented.”333  What many who call for “a level playing field” 
seem to fail to realize is that the courtroom is rarely, if ever, “level”—nor 
                                                          
traditional rules should be revised to protect pro se litigants). 
 327. See Healey, supra note 8, at 133 (explaining that self-representation may enhance a 
litigant’s opportunities for delay, mistrial, and confrontation of witnesses). 
 328. See Jessica Case, Pro Se Litigants at the Summary Judgment Stage:  Is Ignorance of 
the Law an Excuse?, 90 KY. L.J. 701, 737 (2002) (arguing that providing special instructions 
to pro se litigants at the summary judgment stage would give them incentives to attempt to 
excuse mistakes they made even though no such excuse is available to represented litigants). 
 329. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 533-35 (1980) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (recalling the court’s long-standing aversion to titles of nobility and legally 
enshrined distinctions based on race, since they tend to detract from impartial governance). 
 330. McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 1132-33 (identifying the inability of many litigants 
to obtain counsel as one of the most glaring failures of the system). 
 331. Merritt v. Faulkner, 697 F.2d 761, 771 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 332. Suzanne E. Elwell & Christopher D. Carlson, The Iowa Small Claims Court:  An 
Empirical Analysis, 75 IOWA L. REV. 433, 449-50 (1990) (stating that there can be power 
and ability imbalances between pro se litigants just as there can between pro se and parties 
represented by counsel). 
 333. Case, supra note 328, at 737. 
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in reality could it be.  Between any two parties in court there can be power 
imbalances—whether two pro se litigants, two represented litigants, or 
between a pro se and a represented party.334  Many suits, whether criminal 
or civil, possess one side with a much stronger case than their opponent’s.  
If there is one truism of our justice system, it is that the outcome of most 
cases does not seem to hinge on the quality of advocacy alone; parties with 
better representation do not always prevail. The probability of a positive 
outcome is often increased by thorough research and preparation, a strong 
grasp of procedural, evidentiary, and substantive law, and persuasive 
advocacy—but in no way is a positive outcome ever guaranteed. 
As unfortunately access to justice is not guaranteed by having counsel, it 
likewise is not guaranteed to those representing themselves.  Ultimately, 
regardless of if a party is represented or pro se, what is needed is a realistic 
view of the concept of justice. 
III. THE REALITY OF “JUSTICE” 
“[T]he core of the American judicial system is the right to ‘equal justice 
under law.’  On a procedural level, the phrase has generally been taken to 
mean ‘equal access to justice,’ and thus equal access to law.”335  While the 
idea of ensuring, through greater assistance and accommodation, that all 
pro se litigants have the opportunity to have their legal issues heard on the 
merits is noteworthy, it ignores the most fundamental aspect of American 
jurisprudence:  the law does not require that an individual receive a perfect 
trial, but only a fair one.336  Denial of access to the courts does occur for all 
parties—represented and pro se—based on a mandate of societal 
interests.337  Necessary restraints such as filing fees (which are sometimes 
waived) and certain needed procedural requirements do alienate some from 
the legal system.338 
While it could be possible to create a system in which attorneys are 
provided free of charge to all civil litigants and every case is heard fully on 
the merits—it seems that most Americans’ priorities are, legitimately, 
elsewhere.339  If the average American was asked if they are against 
                                                          
 334. See, e.g., Elwell & Carlson, supra note 332, at 449-50 (noting that involvement of 
attorneys in helping to prepare small claims court litigants’ cases can help alleviate the 
disparities that naturally arise even though both parties are pro se). 
 335. Case, supra note 328, at 701-02. 
 336. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 438 (1974) (recalling that presence of 
counsel at a post indictment line-up may be critical to provision of a fair trial). 
 337. Jeanne M. Janchar, Give Me Your Poor . . . In Support of the Constitutionality of the 
Proposed Legal Services Fund, 71 UMKC L. REV. 863, 869 (2003) (discussing the effects 
of high filing fees in dissuading litigants from filing suits). 
 338. See id. (explaining that competing societal interests, such as concerns over crowded 
court dockets, may lead to policies that tend to keep litigants away from court). 
 339. See Sean Swint, Most Americans Very Concerned About Public Health Issues, at 
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innocent people being wrongly convicted or if someone who cannot afford 
an attorney should still have access to the courts they will undoubtedly say 
“yes,” just as they tend to report being “very concerned” about public 
health issues—even though most could not define “public health” or give 
an example of a public health issue.340  Contrary to the desires of those 
calling for greater assistance and accommodation for pro se litigants, as 
long as there is a seven-trillion dollar federal deficit,341 state budgets in 
crisis,342 the need to fight unemployment, counter terrorism, fix social 
security, and all the rest, many Americans will probably not want to see 
their tax dollars used predominantly—or even remotely—to ensure pro se 
court access as opposed to being spent other issues.343  As one 
commentator wrote, “[t]he general mandate of our judicial system, as stated 
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is to provide a ‘just, speedy and 
inexpensive determination of every action.’ . . . [i]n order to secure these 
values, we must recognize that judicial resources are limited . . . .”344  
Maintaining the traditional roles of judicial participants and the equal 
application of procedural and evidentiary rules for all cases provides for the 
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.345 
A. In Defense of Traditional Roles 
Fundamental to the American legal system is the concept of judicial 
neutrality.  “Without such neutrality, the entire legitimacy of the legal 
system, indeed its reason for existence within the democratic experiment, 
fall.”346  The appearance of impartiality is just as important, if not more 
important, as the reality of impartiality.347  If the goal is to ensure that all 
people have “effective, meaningful assistance of the courts” then in theory 
                                                          
http://my.webmd.com/content/article/22/1728_56121?src=Inktomi&condition=home%20&
%20Top%20Stories (Mar. 30, 2000) (on file with the American University Law Review) 
(listing public health, education, infrastructure, defense, and taxes as issues drawing concern 
by the American public). 
 340. See id. (reporting the results of a 1,200 person survey released by the CDC). 
 341. BUREAU OF THE PUBLIC DEBT, at http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/opd/opdpe 
nny.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2005) (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 342. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text. 
 343. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. 
 344. See Mueller, supra note 13, at 111-12 (explaining that the speed of the judicial 
system is directly related to its level of justice and efficiency). 
 345. See id. (adding that career plaintiffs who file an excessive number of complaints 
slow the system down and breed a disrespect for the law).  These concerns are similar to 
those surrounding the issue of the court assisting the pro se litigant. 
 346. See Zorza, supra note 19, at 426 (viewing the vast and intricate rules of the legal 
system as protecting and ensuring neutrality). 
 347. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1997) (discussing a judge’s duty 
to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety).  See generally Harrison, supra 
note 14, at 70 (discussing the reaction of a represented party observing the court assisting a 
self-represented party).  But see Zorza, supra note 19, at 434 (discussing differences 
between the reality of impartiality and the perception of reality in the courtroom). 
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it should apply to all—whether represented or not.  If a judge is going to 
help one party, he or she must be willing to help all parties equally, 
whether represented or not.348  Just as it would be fundamentally wrong for 
a judge to assist only women and not men, or only African Americans and 
not Hispanics, it is likewise fundamentally wrong for a judge to choose to 
only help parties based on their representation status.349  A represented 
party, because of ineffective representation of counsel, may be denied 
effective access to justice just as a pro se litigant might.350  Either the court 
must aid all equally, or aid none equally—but it should not pick and choose 
whom to aid based on representation status, race, gender, or whom the 
court likes the best.351 
While some proponents of greater pro se assistance and accommodation 
argue that judges and court staff have a duty to assist the self-represented 
litigant in exercising their constitutional right to access the courts,352 there 
is nothing in the Constitution or federal law that places an explicit duty on 
judges, clerks, or other court staff to actively aid a party based on his or her 
representation status.353  “In the area of judicial involvement in pro se 
litigation, as elsewhere, there is a line between a ‘legitimate advisory role’ 
and ‘the improper role of an advocate.’”354  That line is often blurry, and 
almost inevitably leads down a slippery slope.  It is one thing for a judge to 
ask a question of a witness called by a party and another for the judge to 
choose which witnesses will appear on behalf of a party.355  The only true 
                                                          
 348. See Zorza, supra note 19, at 439 (“Whatever the judge does, engagement or 
passivity, inquiry or explanation, must be done in a consistent manner.”). 
 349. Cf. Holt, supra note 18, at 170 (describing the balancing act required of judges, 
since they must ensure the pro se litigants right of access, and at the same time must remain 
impartial, favoring neither the represented nor unrepresented). 
 350. See supra notes 308-15 and accompanying text. 
 351. See Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2015 (1999) (stating that a judge 
would be more likely to aid a sympathetic self-represented party than one who is annoying). 
 352. See Holt, supra note 18, at 168 (describing the Sixth Amendment right to be heard 
as relatively meaningless for those without sufficient legal knowledge or assistance). 
 353. See United States v. Pinkey, 548 F.2d 305, 311 (10th Cir. 1977) (“[T]he trial court 
is under no obligation to become an ‘advocate’ for or to assist and guide the pro se layman 
through the trial thicket.”); Decker, supra note 62, at 552-53 (adding that there is no 
obligation for a judge to aid a pro se defendant, even if it is clear that the defense is 
inadequate). 
 354. McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 1124. 
 355. See, e.g., id. at 1124-25 (discussing historically acceptable actions taken by courts 
during a trial to further the ends of justice); Pinkey, 548 F.2d at 308 ( 
The adversary nature of criminal proceedings does not prohibit the trial judge from 
taking proper steps to aid and assist the jury in the truth finding quest leading to the 
proper determination of guilt or innocence.  In the promotion of this goal, the trial 
judge has an obligation, on his own initiative, at proper times and in a dignified, 
and impartial manner, to inject certain matters into the trial which he deems 
important in the search for truth. 
); cf. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933) (“[T]he judge is not a mere 
moderator, but is the governor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct and 
of determining questions of law.”). 
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way of ensuring that the line between judge and advocate would not be 
crossed would be to prohibit judges from giving advice to any party, 
represented or not.356  As the U.S. Supreme Court concluded, a judge 
cannot effectively discharge both the role of being the judge and counsel 
for a party.357  A judge’s role must be that of a judge, and not a 
combination of judge and advocate/representative/counsel.358  The court is 
under no obligation to guide a self-represented litigant through the trial 
process.359  The self-represented party cannot shift the burden of litigating 
his case onto the court.360  A self-represented litigant, “does not have a 
constitutional right to receive personal instruction from the trial judge . . . 
[n]or does the Constitution require,” a judge to serve as an advocate for a 
self-represented party.361  If the court were to assist a party, it would 
become a player in the adversary process rather than the referee.362  When a 
judge takes on the role of advocate for a pro se litigant, it could bias the 
outcome against an opposing represented party in a manner completely 
unrelated to the merits of the case.363 
If a court were to slide down the slope of actively assisting pro se 
litigants, it is an exceedingly dangerous and slippery one.364  Even though 
proponents argue for judicial assistance of pro se litigants against opposing 
attorneys, to be truly fair should not the court be willing to help either side 
which is not performing well in court?  Not all lawyers were created equal, 
                                                          
 356. Cf. Kim, supra note 31, at 1645 (reporting that courts do not see a need to guide or 
inform pro se litigants in areas of substantive law, instead holding them to the same standard 
as a licensed attorney). 
 357. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 510 (1962).  See generally Case, supra note 328, 
at 727-40 (criticizing a rule requiring district court judges to notify pro se litigants of the 
procedures of the summary judgment rule). 
 358. See Kim, supra note 31, at 1646 (“Courts cannot be expected to assume the 
awkward position, not to mention the imposition, of serving as both adjudicator and counsel 
for the pro se litigant.  Such a position would place the court in conflict with the very 
structure of the adversarial system.”). 
 359. Pinkey, 548 F.2d at 311; see Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1366 n.10 (9th Cir. 
1986) (stating that “merely taking the pro se status of litigants into account in determining 
compliance with technical pleading or procedural rules does not require the district court to 
inform the litigant of how to comply with the federal rules . . . .”). 
 360. See Dozier v. Ford Motor Co., 702 F.2d 1189, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (seeing no 
need for special consideration for a pro se litigant who is seeking a monetary reward). 
 361. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183-84 (1983).  The Court added that a judge 
may ensure compliance with procedure in other ways, by finding no Sixth Amendment 
violation when a judge appoints standby counsel to assist a pro se defendant with routine 
procedure, even if the defendant objects to the assistance.  Id. at 184. 
 362. Jacobsen, 790 F.2d at 1366; see Bradlow, supra note 19, at 671 (stating that 
“[e]xtending too much procedural leniency to a pro se litigant risks undermining the 
impartial role of the judge in the adversary system”). 
 363. See Sales et al., supra note 278, at 558 (describing the ethical catch-22 for judges 
who must ensure that the pro se litigant is not disadvantaged, while at the same time not 
allowing this judicial assistance to disadvantage the opposing represented party). 
 364. See Kim, supra note 31, at 1646 (asserting that a judge who assists a pro se litigant 
risks coming into direct conflict with the structure of the adversarial system). 
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at least in terms of ability.365  Should the judge help the weaker attorney to 
ensure that it was the merits of the case, and not legal knowledge or 
advocacy ability of the attorney that decides the outcome?  If the weaker 
attorney cannot lay a proper foundation for the admission of evidence or 
asks the wrong questions on cross examination, should not the judge do it 
for the attorney just as some are advocating that the judge do so for pro se 
litigants?  If a judge is going to help a self-represented litigant negotiate a 
settlement, will he or she also help an attorney negotiate with another 
attorney?  If a pro se litigant is better at litigating or negotiating than an 
opposing attorney, should the judge aid the attorney against the pro se 
litigant?  As absurd a scenario as it seems, it is the logical extension of a 
judge providing active assistance to a litigant to ensure his or her “access to 
justice.” 
Ultimately, those who advocate for judicial assistance for pro se litigants 
argue that judges should act one way when both parties are self-
represented,366 another when both are represented by counsel, and a third 
way when one party is represented and one is not.367  True impartiality and 
equality, however, would only be achieved by either helping no parties or 
by helping all parties all the time.  The first option of refusing to help any 
party would be the easiest to achieve and the most visibly impartial.368  The 
second would be difficult to ensure that the same amount of assistance was 
consistently offered, and there might be times when parties—whether 
represented or not—may not wish to be aided by the court.369  They or their 
counsel may have a very good reason for not asking a question, calling a 
witness, or introducing a certain piece of evidence.  If a judge’s 
“assistance” hurts their case, should that be grounds for a reversal on 
appeal—or a suit for damages against the judge?  The parties to a suit, 
whether represented or not, are adults and they should be allowed to make 
choices.370  Constant judicial “assistance” could potentially negate their 
ability to make choices, leading to the question as to whether the right to 
                                                          
 365. See supra notes 308-15 and accompanying text. 
 366. See Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2016-18 (suggesting that when both 
parties are self-represented the judge should act like an administrative law judge, handling 
the questions and developing the evidence of the parties). 
 367. See Zorza, supra note 19, at 434 (advocating non-passive, engaged judges when one 
side is represented and one is not). 
 368. See id. at 428 (alluding to the character of a television show judge who does no 
more than oversee the proceedings and responds only when called upon to do so by 
counsel). 
 369. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 172-73 (1984) (involving a litigant who at 
times refused the assistance of court appointed counsel, even when such assistance was 
insisted upon by the court). 
 370. See Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2030 (discussing court interference 
with a party’s right to engage in a private contract). 
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access the courts also includes the right to be free from unwanted 
assistance from the court.371 
Some commentators also worry that the existence of pro se assistance 
programs can discourage individuals who would otherwise seek legal help, 
and who need it, from seeking it.372  As consumers become more 
resourceful and more skilled, they are in some cases becoming less trusting 
of legal service providers.373  This, however, is the risk of any consumer-
driven process:  when consumers have choices, they may make the wrong 
choice.374  This is true whether the individual is buying automobile repair 
parts, choosing dietary supplements, or filing a petition to institute a legal 
proceeding.  Judicial paternalism should be discarded; merely because the 
individual may make a bad choice is no reason to deny them the 
opportunity to make choices. 
“Trial courts generally do not intervene to save litigants from their 
choice of counsel;” a party that chooses to represent himself should be 
treated the same.375  Self-represented litigants should bear the consequences 
of choices they make in litigation just as represented parties do.376  While a 
represented party would have recourse against their attorney for 
malpractice, this does not compensate them for the loss of the opportunity 
to obtain trial on the merits of their case, especially if they were seeking 
declaratory or injunctive relief.377  With apologies to personal injury and 
medical malpractice attorneys everywhere, it is not always about the 
money.378  A represented party whose attorney fails to follow the rules 
resulting in the dismissal or loss of their suit suffers the same fate as the 
                                                          
 371. See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 187-88 (concluding that standby counsel cannot assist a 
pro se defendant in presenting a substantive defense if the defendant does not want court 
appointed assistance; however, since the court appointed standby counsel only assisted in 
minor procedural elements of the case the rights of the pro se defendant were not violated). 
 372. See, e.g., Michael Robertson & Jeff Giddings, Legal Consumers as Coproducers:  
The Changing Face of Legal Service Delivery in Australia, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 63, 72 (2002) 
(expressing a concern that those taking advantage of self help services will not recognize 
their limitations); Bonnie Sudderth, President’s Column, 38 CT. REV. 3 (2002) (“By making 
the legal system more easily maneuverable for pro se litigants, are we encouraging more 
self-representation than would otherwise occur in the system?”). 
 373. See Robertson & Giddings, supra note 372, at 72-73 (listing eleven reasons for the 
growth of self-help legal services). 
 374. See Carl Howe et al., The Problem of Too Much Choice, at 
http://www.blackfriarsinc.com/totm.html (June 1, 2004) (on file with the American 
University Law Review) (believing that, when it comes to giving the average consumer a 
choice in which goods to buy, the less choice given the better off the consumer will be). 
 375. Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364-65 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 376. Cf. id. at 1365 n.7 (explaining that should a court act on behalf of a pro se litigant it 
will call into question its impartiality and will discriminate against the opposing represented 
party). 
 377. Jacobsen, 790 F.2d at 1365 n.6. 
 378. See, e.g., United States v. Melendrez, 389 F.3d 829, 835 n.12 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(arguing that identity theft, in addition to harming the victim’s financial well being, can 
cause serious damage to the victim’s reputation and convenience). 
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unrepresented party that likewise fails to follow the rules.  Mistakes of 
attorneys are not perceived to deprive their clients of due process and 
access to the courts, even though the result can be losing or dismissal of a 
case.379 
As with judges, the roles of clerks should not be deviated from in an 
effort to assist one group of litigants against another.  As any litigator or 
judge would immediately declare, clerks and other court staff are 
absolutely essential to the courts and the judicial process.380  Most clerks’ 
office staff, however, are not trained attorneys, nor is there any requirement 
for them to be able to perform their important function of keeping the 
courts operating.381  Lay-persons—whether deputy clerks, intake officers, 
or bailiffs—no matter how well meaning or adept at their job, cannot give 
comprehensive, competent, legal advice as a properly trained attorney 
can.382  Their knowledge of the law and legal remedies comes from their 
observations of their courts—and can reflect that a little learning is a 
dangerous thing.383  While many perform their functions admirably, 
sometimes under adverse conditions, “[c]lerks may not be equipped to 
provide the necessary advice and may give bad advice.  The courts may 
increasingly be faced with litigants having relied to their detriment on poor 
advice from clerks, or on a misunderstanding of a clerk’s accurate 
statements.”384  Incomplete legal advice, lacking full issue analysis and 
presenting to the individual a range of options with attendant ramifications 
explained, is tantamount to no advice at all.385 
Even if the possibility of prosecution for the unauthorized practice of law 
and civil liability386 were removed, the logic of the restrictions would still 
                                                          
 379. But see, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 647 (1962) (Black, J., 
dissenting) (sympathizing with a client who reasonably had no idea that his lawyer was 
careless and ineffective); Georcely v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 45, 50 (1st Cir. 2004) (mentioning 
that ineffective assistance from counsel can be a basis for relief in immigration cases); 
Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 369, 377 (3d Cir. 2003) (allowing for the possibility of a 
claim for ineffective assistance of counsel when an alien in a deportation case shows 
prejudice); In re Jamie TT, 599 N.Y.S.2d 892, 895 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (holding that in a 
hearing to decide if a minor should be placed in the custody of an individual accused of 
sexually molesting her, the child has the right to effective assistance of counsel). 
 380. See Witter v. County Comm’rs, 100 N.E. 148 (Ill. 1912) (discussing the need for a 
court appointed probation officer in juvenile cases involving dependant, neglected, and 
delinquent children). 
 381. See Holt, supra note 18, at 170 (explaining that clerks are not allowed to give legal 
advice because they are not lawyers, and as such should be prevented from practicing law). 
 382. See Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 1997 (discussing the limits on a 
clerk’s ability to assist a pro se litigant, and describing the quality of a clerk’s legal advice 
as poor). 
 383. Harrison, supra note 14, at 70. 
 384. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2038. 
 385. See Holt, supra note 18, at 170-71 (worrying that a clerk’s lack of expertise may 
prevent a pro se litigant from having proper access to the courts). 
 386. See generally Healey, supra note 8, at 129-30 (discussing the unauthorized practice 
of law in a law library context). 
SWANK OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  2:46:15 PM 
1586 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1537 
apply to prohibiting clerks and court staff from providing legal advice.387  
While the definitions and even rationale for prohibiting the unauthorized 
practice of law varies from state to state,388 it generally seeks to protect the 
public from receiving legal advice from unqualified persons, no matter how 
well-intentioned or knowledgeable about court procedures they may be.389  
It does not matter that a clerk or court staff member would not likely be 
successfully prosecuted for providing legal advice in the course of their 
duties390 or whether a judge sanctioned their actions or not.391  What 
matters is that “[u]nrepresented litigants must have access to competent 
advice to help them decide whether they should bring their problems before 
the court, and, if so, what remedies they should seek.”392  They cannot get 
this from individuals who are not trained (and hopefully competent) 
attorneys.  If the issue is that there are not enough licensed attorneys 
providing competent, comprehensive legal advice to the public, the solution 
is not to have individuals, no matter how well meaning, provide advice that 
in all likelihood is neither competent nor comprehensive.393 
B. In Defense of Rules 
Some proponents of greater pro se assistance and accommodation argue 
that it is unfair in litigation to have pro se litigants abide by the rules that 
govern represented parties—since they do not know the rules and are 
incapable of learning them.394  Rules, however, exist for a reason.  They 
provide stability, predictability and legitimacy to court proceedings.395  
                                                          
 387. See generally Holt, supra note 18, at 170-71 (reasoning that clerks are not allowed 
to give legal advice because they are not lawyers and could not provide complete legal 
advice). 
 388. See generally Goldschmidt, supra note 3 (listing opinions from Arizona, Indiana, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, and Oregon). 
 389. See Healey, supra note 8, at 139-40 (viewing the prohibition of the unauthorized 
practice of law as a way to ensure that a layperson only receive legal protection from those 
adequately trained to give it); Hurder, supra note 50, at 2243 (contending that protection of 
the public from harm is the main reason for unauthorized practice rules). 
 390. See generally Healey, supra note 8, at 139-42 (stating that lacking a pecuniary 
motive, it is unlikely that a person would be successfully prosecuted for the unauthorized 
practice of law). 
 391. Hurder, supra note 50, at 2242-43 (stating that Rule 5.5 of the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct makes it unethical for a lawyer to “assist a person who is not a 
member of the bar in the performance of activity that constitutes the unauthorized practice 
of law.” ).  Presumably, this prohibition would be applicable against judges, who are 
lawyers, as well. 
 392. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2038. 
 393. See supra note 385 and accompanying text. 
 394. Peter L. Murray & John C. Sheldon, Should the Rules of Evidence Be Modified for 
Civil Non-Jury Trials?, 17 ME. BAR J. 30 (2002) (“Many pro se litigants do not suspect the 
existence of rules of evidence, and practically all do not understand them.”) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 395. See Sheldon, supra note 189, at 311-13 (discussing a criticism of the author’s 
previous article advocating the abandonment of the rules of evidence in non-jury cases). 
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These are the hallmarks of our legal system and a requirement of any 
system that proffers to advance the cause of justice.  This is a truism 
regardless of the representation status of the parties.  In any event, criticism 
of the “rules” is nothing new, nor has that criticism been ignored.396  
Modern rules of both criminal and civil procedure have done a great deal to 
eliminate technicalities, create uniformity, and simplify court processes.397  
Efforts to remove the technicalities in pleadings and proceedings have been 
ongoing since the mid-1800s.398 
Procedural law, however, is “the judicial process for enforcing rights and 
duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy 
and redress for disregard or infraction of them.”399  Procedural and 
evidentiary rules developed over time to prohibit misleading and 
untrustworthy evidence.400  The importance of the rules is clear: 
Under Rules-based law, judges apply pre-existing legal doctrines to the 
facts to reach what are supposed to be strictly rational and objective 
decisions, untainted by the personal views of the judge . . . . These 
doctrines are themselves deductions from other, more fundamental 
principles, and the entirety forms a logically consistent and intellectually 
sound body of law . . . . Even if some such rules (or instructions) seem 
unfair sometimes . . . their time-tested ‘reasonableness,’ endows them 
with credibility and with precedential value for later cases and, 
ultimately, establishes the credibility of the legal process itself.401 
Judgments need to be based “on a strict, logical application of legal 
rules, without regard for the result.”402 
The ability to self-represent should therefore not be a license to ignore 
relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.403  In Logan v. 
                                                          
 396. See id. at 311 (quoting from a published criticism against the author by two Arizona 
state judges, which directly responded to a disapproval of the “rules” by pointing to judicial 
assistance programs as a better way to assist pro se litigants than eliminating the “rules”). 
 397. See United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376 (1953) (discussing the procedural 
simplicity of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 
(1965) (explaining that one of the goals of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to create 
uniformity in federal courts). 
 398. See Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Vance, 60 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1857) (explaining 
that, in admiralty cases, the rules of pleading are simple and do not have many of the 
technical requirements found in the common law at the time); see also Jackson v. Virginia 
Hot Springs Co., 213 F. 969, 974 (4th Cir. 1914) (declaring that the plaintiff did not need to 
address any possible defenses in his declaration). 
 399. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941). 
 400. See Goldschmidt, supra note 3, at 40 (tying the rise in procedural sophistication to 
the rise of lawyers and the legal profession). 
 401. See Sheldon, supra note 189, at 304-05 (discussing a criticism of the author’s 
previous article advocating the abandonment of the rules of evidence in non-jury cases). 
 402. Id. at 315. 
 403. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 n.46  (1974) (recognizing the 
constitutional right of self-representation in criminal cases); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 
168, 173 (1984) (finding the right to self-representation was not violated when an appointed 
standby counsel assisted with some procedural elements and did not prevent the defendant 
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Zimmerman Brush Co. the Supreme Court held that while due process 
grants a party the opportunity to present his case and have its merits fairly 
judged, if the party fails to comply with a reasonable procedural 
requirement, then the merits of the case do not have to be heard.404  When 
an individual appears representing himself, he subjects himself to the 
established rules of practice and procedure.405  With regard to the rules, 
self-represented litigants should be treated neither better, nor worse, than 
parties with attorneys.406 
Ultimately, either our justice system will have rules that apply to all, or 
no rules at all.  Any belief that there could be one set of rules for one group 
of people, and another set of rules for another group—and both systems 
would be equally fair and just—is doomed to failure.  Separate but equal 
did not work for schools or drinking fountains; it will not work for our 
courts as well even if the discriminating factor is not race but rather 
representation status.407  Having rules that apply to some parties, but not 
others, will produce inequitable and unjust results.  Rules are fair when 
applied evenly to all; when they are to be followed by some, but not others, 
regardless of the criteria, they cease to be “rules” and undermine the 
legitimacy of the entire system.408  Justice should not depend on which 
judge a litigant is assigned to; the system as a whole must provide it.  As 
one author noted, 
It is illogical and unfair to tell a man ‘everyone is charged with knowing 
the law,’ and ‘ignorance of the law is no excuse,’ when we send him to 
prison for violating a law he did not know about . . . and then when in 
prison he sues someone, to say he is not charged with knowing the law 
governing procedure in his own lawsuit until we send him a personal 
                                                          
from presenting his own case); see also Case, supra note 328, at 707-08 (stating that only in 
the reading of initial pleadings are pro se litigants treated differently than represented 
parties). 
 404. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 433-37 (1982) (finding that the 
defendant’s case had yet to be heard on the merits when, through no fault of the defendant’s, 
a state official failed to comply with procedure). 
 405. See generally Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 510-17 (1962) (finding that the 
defendant had not waived his right to an attorney; this need was highlighted by the fact that 
the defendant still had to meet the various rules of procedure, and had failed to do so); see 
also Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981) (concluding that the pro se litigant did 
not merit an extension of the timely filing requirement merely because he was pro se). 
 406. See Decker, supra note 62, at 551-52 (providing examples of cases in which the 
judge was not required to, and indeed did not, provide assistance to a pro se litigant 
opposing a represented party). 
 407. See Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2012-15 (expressing concerns that a 
judge assisting a pro se litigant, whose opponent is represented by counsel, may jeopardize 
the judge’s ability to remain impartial, and may encourage more litigants to appear in court 
without counsel). 
 408. Cf. Zorza, supra note 19, at 426 (“Without [judicial] neutrality, the entire legitimacy 
of the legal system, indeed its reason for existence within the democratic experiment, fall.”). 
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explanation.409 
While it is true that “[t]he rules of the game were crafted by judges and 
lawyers”410 they were not done so to exclude self-represented litigants.  The 
rules “not only permit, but should as nearly as possible guarantee that bona 
fide complaints be carried to an adjudication on the merits.”411  If there 
truly is a desire, however, to level the playing field for all litigants—
including the pro se—it can only be accomplished by consistent, even 
application of legal precedent and rules of procedure.412  As one author 
stated, “[t]he opportunity of a pro se litigant to be heard need not be further 
advanced by eroding the purpose and meaning of the rules, nor by changing 
the nature of the adversary system or the role of judges in the nation’s 
courts.”413 
CONCLUSION 
While not as extreme as questioning whether there should be any pro se 
assistance,414 this article argues that education and information programs—
not the elimination of the adversarial system of justice or equal application 
of the law—are the best way to assist the self-represented without 
discriminating against the represented.  The first and foremost goal of pro 
se assistance should not be to create a “level playing field,” but rather to 
provide information and eradicate barriers so as to ensure that a pro se 
litigant can gain meaningful access to the courts.  There is no effort to 
“level the playing field” for attorneys, even though bad attorneys can 
prevent their clients from getting access to justice.  The Due Process Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution requires that “the burdens placed upon one group 
of litigants be no greater nor less than those placed upon others.”415  Pro se 
litigants should be treated neither better, nor worse, than represented parties 
                                                          
 409. See Case, supra note 328, at 701 (quoting a dissent from a Ninth Circuit case). 
 410. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 7, at 2069. 
 411. See Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 373 (1966) (finding that there 
was no Rule 23(b) strike suit, and that a trial on the merits was required, when a petitioner 
with a limited knowledge of the English language relied on her son-in-law’s explanation of 
the facts before signing a complaint in a stockholder derivative suit). 
 412. See Smith v. Litton Loan Servicing, No. CIV.A.04-02846, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
1815, at *45, 2005 WL 288827 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2005) (asserting that legal precedent and 
legal rules allow the poor an even footing with the rich, the small with the large, and the 
novice with the expert); see also Case, supra note 328, at 740-41 (quoting two Supreme 
Court cases that stressed the importance of adhering to procedural requirements and 
maintaining the dignity of the courtroom). 
 413. Case, supra note 328, at 706. 
 414. See Sudderth, supra note 372 (figuring that, if lawyers should be discouraged from 
representing themselves in court, then certainly those not trained in the law should not be 
encouraged or assisted in representing themselves in court). 
 415. See generally Mueller, supra note 13, at 116 (explaining that since all people have a 
right of court access, a right that the Supreme Court found to be identical for all people, then 
no one person should have less of a burden simply because they are not represented by 
counsel). 
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in this or any other respect.  The Constitution does not make an exception 
when dealing with individuals who voluntarily or involuntarily represent 
themselves. 
All litigants, whether represented or pro se, deserve the same due process 
rights, including among others the opportunity to be heard, given adequate 
notice, to have a neutral and detached decision maker, to be able to present 
evidence, and the opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses at 
trial.416  If the trial court were to help one side of a lawsuit rather than 
another solely because of the status of their legal representation, it would 
necessarily implicate the court’s impartiality and discriminate against the 
party with counsel.417  If self-represented litigants in general have problems 
with the rules, the solution is to re-write them to be more clear and 
understandable; the solution is not to eliminate the rules for them entirely 
nor have judges abandon the role of the neutral decision maker to become 
an advocate for one party against the other.  “While it may be enticing to 
dumb-down the rules of evidence, the siren song of protecting pro se 
litigants should not come at the expense of sacrificing those fundamental 
principles upon which those rules have been based, and the protections they 
provide.”418 
Sometimes, despite the best devised forms or the most perfectly 
explained procedures, meaningful access to the courts requires the 
representation of counsel.419  There are some cases that are so complex, or 
in areas of the law so arcane, that only experienced, competent counsel 
could effectively litigate them.  Likewise, there will be some individuals 
that due to language or mental impairment, will be unable to represent 
themselves successfully in court.  Neither of these reasons justify, however, 
eliminating the rules and roles or the adversarial system of justice.  Rather, 
they are the scenarios that legal assistance models offering representation 
must be designed and funded to support. 
Pro se assistance efforts, such as making easily comprehendible forms in 
appropriate languages and guides for conducting one’s case and self in 
court, make it possible for pro se litigants to abide by the rules.  If pro se 
litigants choose to ignore the rules and requirements, their cases should be 
dismissed just the same as if they were an attorney who ignored them.  For 
                                                          
 416. See Bradlow, supra note 19, at 676 (contending that in order for a pro se litigant to 
receive a meaningful opportunity to be heard he is entitled to, at a minimum, a liberal 
construction of his pleadings). 
 417. Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1365 n.7 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 418. Sheldon, supra note 189, at 311 (quoting an article written by two Arizona state 
judges while discussing a criticism of the author’s previous article advocating the 
abandonment of the rules of evidence in non-jury cases). 
 419. Merritt v. Faulkner et al., 697 F.2d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing Powell v. 
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)).  Some cases require a level of expertise that even an 
intelligent layman cannot meet.  Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. 
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the system to be fundamentally fair, all must be treated the same by the 
rules, the judges, the clerks, and the opposing attorneys. 
 
